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CLEAN ENERGY JUSTICE: CHARTING AN
EMERGING AGENDA
Shelley Welton* & Joel Eisen**
The rapid transition to clean energy is fraught with potential inequities. As clean energy
policies ramp up in scale and ambition, they confront challenging new questions: Who should
pay for the transition? Who should live next to the industrial-scale wind and solar farms these
policies promote? Will the new “green” economy be a fairer one, with more widespread oppor-
tunity, than the fossil fuel economy it is replacing? Who gets to decide what kinds of resources
power our decarbonized world? In this article, we frame these challenges as part of an emerg-
ing agenda of “clean energy justice.” Mapping this agenda highlights the equity challenges that
will attend the transition to clean energy, and allows for more comprehensive, creative ap-
proaches to legal and policy solutions.
A cleaner energy economy does not ineluctably translate into a more just economy. We
identify four considerations that will be critical to ensure that clean energy does not entrench
widening inequalities in wealth and power: (1) how to fund the transition; (2) who benefits
from the upsides of the new clean energy economy, including green jobs and new technologies
like rooftop solar panels; (3) who participates in decisions about the shape of the new clean
energy economy; and (4) how and where new clean energy infrastructure is sited. Drawing
from available data, we describe why there are real risks that the gains of clean energy might
be unequally distributed, while the costs fall on rural communities and non-adopters of new
technologies, thus exacerbating inequality while greening the grid. And through original em-
pirical research, we highlight the challenges of full and equal participation in the esoteric,
technocratic procedures of energy law.
The present moment is a critical one for bringing these diverse considerations together
into this overarching agenda. The U.S. energy system is in the early days of a long transition
away from fossil fuels towards clean energy. It is time for energy lawmakers and energy law
scholars to better anticipate the distributive and procedural justice concerns that will attend
this transition, and to forge new ways to address them.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The rapid transition to clean energy is fraught with potential inequities.
As clean energy policies ramp up in scale and ambition, they confront challeng-
ing new questions: Who should pay for the transition to clean energy? Who
should live next to the industrial-scale wind and solar farms these policies pro-
mote? Will the new “green” economy be a fairer one, with more widespread
opportunity, than the fossil fuel economy it is replacing? Who gets to decide
what kinds of resources power our decarbonized world?
In this Article, we assert that it is useful to understand these challenges as
part of an emerging agenda of “clean energy justice.” We argue that the present
moment is a critical one for bringing these diverse considerations together into
this overarching agenda. The U.S. energy system is in the early days of a long
transition away from fossil fuels towards clean energy.1 It is time for energy
lawmakers and energy law scholars to better anticipate the distributive and pro-
cedural justice concerns2 that will attend the transition to a clean energy econ-
omy, and to forge new ways to address them.
The concerns addressed in this article grow out of policy reforms that are,
in many ways, very good news. In 2018, California became the second state to
1. See generally Joel B. Eisen & Felix Mormann, Free Trade in Electric Power, 2018 UTAH L.
REV. 49 (observing that it will take decades of progress to achieve a fully interactive electric
grid); Shelley Welton, Grasping for Energy Democracy, 116 MICH. L. REV. 581 (2018).
2. For an explanation of these terms, see infra Part II.
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pledge to receive 100% of its energy from clean sources by 2045 (joining Ha-
waii, which made a 100% renewable energy promise in 2015).3 In total as of
October 2018, twenty-nine states have promised to increase the amount of en-
ergy they receive from renewable resources,4 and laws to promote “clean en-
ergy”—from wind turbines, solar panels, hydropower, biomass, energy
efficiency, and reduced peak demand5—are proliferating,6 often in a surpris-
ingly bipartisan fashion.7 These laws have been so successful in boosting clean
energy industries that even absent federal support, analysts predict that clean
energy will continue a meteoric rise over the next several decades.8 And should
the excitement around the “Green New Deal” ultimately translate into federal
legislation, the U.S. transition to clean energy might accelerate significantly.9
Clean energy brings significant benefits for the global climate and local air
quality. Nevertheless, a cleaner energy economy does not ineluctably translate
to a more just economy. Instead, if the clean energy transition is funded largely
3. 100 Percent Clean Energy Act of 2018, ch. 312, 2018 Cal. Stat. 2763; Act 97, 2015 Haw.
Sess. Laws 245 (amending HAW. REV. STAT. § 269-92); Press Release, Governor of State
of Hawaii David Y. Ige, Governor Ige Signs Bill Setting 100 Percent Renewable Energy
Goal In Power Sector (Jan. 8, 2015).
4. States promote renewables through laws setting renewable portfolio standards and establish-
ing other incentive programs, as discussed further in Part II. See DATABASE OF STATE
INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY, https://perma.cc/G5N6-UF9K [hereinaf-
ter DSIRE DATABASE] (listing the various programs for each state).
5. For a discussion of demand reduction techniques (including “demand response” and others)
and their historical uses, see Joel B. Eisen, Demand Response’s Three Generations: Market
Pathways and Challenges in the Modern Electric Grid, 18 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 351 (2017)
[hereinafter Eisen, Demand Response’s Three Generations].
6. Shelley Welton, Electricity Markets and the Social Project of Decarbonization, 118 COLUM. L.
REV. 1067, 1069 (2018) [hereinafter Welton, Social Project].
7. Two recent examples of bipartisan cooperation in promoting clean energy are Nevada’s res-
toration of near-full retail rates for net metering through legislative and regulatory actions,
and New Jersey’s legislative package in 2018 that supports the state’s aging nuclear plants
while setting ambitious goals for renewable energy. A.B. 405, 2017 Leg., 69th Reg. Sess.
(Nev. 2017); Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Joint Application by NV Energy
on Assembly Bill 405, Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Nev., No. 17-07026, Sept. 1, 2017; A.B. 3723
& S. 2313, 2018–2019 Leg. Sess. (N.J. 2018).
8. In 2018, the U.S. Energy Information Administration predicted that renewable energy
sources will see explosive growth in the United States between now and 2050. See infra notes
40–41 and accompanying text. The National Renewable Energy Laboratory’s (NREL) Re- R
newable Electricity Futures Study details how renewables could meet eighty percent of the
nation’s electricity demand by 2050. NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., RENEWABLE
ELECTRICITY FUTURES STUDY (2012), https://perma.cc/2WAN-XLXU.
9. See Dino Grandoni, The Energy 202: Lots of People Support the ‘Green New Deal.’ So What Is
It?, WASH. POST (Dec. 19, 2018), https://perma.cc/J534-XG57 (reporting that a survey by
Yale and George Mason University found that eighty-one percent of registered voters
backed the Green New Deal when it was described as “a plan to generate all of the nation’s
electricity from renewable sources within 10 years while providing job training for those
displaced from traditional energy sector jobs”).
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by the poor, and results primarily in new gadgets and lower electric bills for the
rich, it could exacerbate inequality. This potential is all too painfully familiar for
scholars and practitioners of environmental law. Environmentalists came late to
understand the ways in which central environmental statutes ignore—and per-
haps amplify—unequal distributions of environmental harms.10
To stave off a similar fate for clean energy laws and policies, this Article
articulates why justice matters in the clean energy transition and examines the
central justice concerns beginning to arise. Our approach is both theoretical and
data-driven. In Part II, we explain why attention to the justice implications of
clean energy is important. We articulate normative and pragmatic theories that
highlight the centrality of energy to modern conceptions of a decent life, the
importance of coalition-building to advance the project of decarbonization, and
the opportunities that clean energy’s technological transformation of the U.S.
electric grid creates for addressing inequality. The remainder of the Article ex-
plores four concerns central to promoting justice during the clean energy transi-
tion. Here, we supplement our theoretical examination with data on rooftop
solar participation, data on the demographics of clean energy jobs, and two
original empirical studies of the challenges of participating in clean energy
proceedings.
The first clean energy justice concern is the question of how to fund the
transition. Right now, electricity bills fund most new energy infrastructure. But
as certain electricity consumers become electricity producers by adopting roof-
top solar, electricity storage, or other emerging technologies, funding a clean
energy buildout through these volumetric bills may come to feel less fair. If
more affluent consumers are best able to lower their electricity bills through
clean energy investments, a class divide could emerge in who funds the clean
energy buildout. Part III takes up this question of “who pays,” describing the
10. Jedediah Purdy, The Long Environmental Justice Movement, 44 ECOLOGY L.Q. 809, 825–35
(2018) (exploring why environmental statutes lack distributive considerations). Many schol-
ars have observed mainstream environmentalism’s inattention to the distributional inequities
of environmental protection and harm. See, e.g., Eileen Gauna, The Environmental Justice
Misfit: Public Participation and the Paradigm Paradox, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 9 (1998);
Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice: Bridging the Gap Between Environmental Laws and
“Justice,” 47 AM. U. L. REV. 221, 262–63 (1997); Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing “Environmen-
tal Justice”: The Distributional Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 787,
787 (1993) (noting that policymakers have largely ignored “the potential for distributional
inequities” of environmental protection); Gerald Torres, Environmental Burdens and Demo-
cratic Justice, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 431, 435–36 (1994) (explaining a range of “distribu-
tional inequities” in environmental law, including increased hazardous waste siting, elevated
blood lead levels, increased occupational exposure to chemicals, and reduced air quality in
minority areas). In the decades since these critiques were raised, principles of environmental
justice have been integrated into environmental protection, although not as thoroughly as
many would desire. See generally THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: THEORIES AND
PROCEDURES TO ADDRESS DISPROPORTIONATE RISKS (Michael Gerrard & Sheila Foster
eds., 2007); Purdy, supra, at 818.
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challenging empirics of cross-subsidization arguments and the ways in which
utilities use these arguments for self-serving ends.
The flip side of asking who pays for clean energy is the question of who
benefits from it. Clean energy advocates have amassed support for their policies
by promising revolutionary economic possibilities, including the creation of a
slew of stable, domestic jobs and widespread opportunities for consumers to
become energy producers.11 How these potential benefits of clean energy are
distributed thus becomes a critical component of how Americans perceive the
transition’s fairness. Part IV examines the distribution of the upsides of the
burgeoning clean energy economy, analyzing the distribution of clean energy
jobs and new technologies such as electric vehicles across class and race. As we
show, the data suggest that significant inequities exist in the clean energy
workforce and the adoption of clean energy technologies.
The third major component of a clean energy justice agenda concerns how
individuals participate in decisionmaking during the transition. Much climate
change policy to date has focused on how much we should decarbonize, and
how fast. But as states cement their objectives in this regard, a new question
comes into focus: What do we want decarbonization to look like? Should it
include new nuclear plants, waste-to-energy, or other controversial technolo-
gies? Should we devote significant open space to industrial-scale wind and solar
farms? Should we require significant and intrusive conservation efforts? In Part
V, we consider the modes through which persons can participate in these deci-
sions—and the potential challenges that energy law presents to equal participa-
tion—with support from our empirical studies. We conclude that energy law
fora present particularly challenging arenas for broad-based participation.
Fourth, a concern that has dogged traditional energy infrastructure persists
in the shift to clean energy: Where should it be built? One focus of the environ-
mental justice movement over the past fifty years has been the unequal distribu-
tion of polluting industrial facilities.12 Although clean energy facilities are in
most instances less polluting than those they replace, they carry their own
downsides as neighbors.13 For this reason, the question of where renewable en-
ergy is sited—and how siting decisions are made—will also be important to
ensure a just clean energy transition. Part VI explores these issues.
Each of these four concerns has been discussed in the academic literature
and in policy debates,14 but not in a holistic fashion. Our more comprehensive
11. See infra Part IV; see also Sharon B. Jacobs, The Energy Prosumer, 43 ECOLOGY L.Q. 519,
520 (2017). See generally VAN JONES, THE GREEN COLLAR ECONOMY: HOW ONE SOLU-
TION CAN FIX OUR TWO BIGGEST PROBLEMS (2008); Just Transition: A Framework for
Change, CLIMATE JUSTICE ALL., https://perma.cc/7XEG-7W76.
12. See Kaswan, supra note 10, at 272; Lazarus, supra note 10, at 801–05 (discussing the founda- R
tional studies documenting this inequity).
13. See Jeanne Marie Zokovitch Paben, Green Power & Environmental Justice — Does Green
Discriminate?, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1067, 1093–96 (2014).
14. See Cecilia Martinez, Environmental Justice and the Clean Power Plan: The Case of Energy
Efficiency, 41 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 605 (2017); Uma Outka, Environ-
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analysis helps highlight where we are lacking sufficient and important data in
each of these areas—a critical first step in building a clean energy justice
agenda. Indeed, these research gaps themselves arguably constitute an addi-
tional clean energy injustice, because as Gwen Ottinger has explained: “The
systematic non-production of knowledge represents an injustice in that the re-
sulting knowledge gaps tend to correlate with the same low-income, high-mi-
nority areas that bear the brunt of industrial pollution.”15
Much of our goal in framing the contours of “clean energy justice” is to
illustrate why it is important to understand these issues as a distinct and com-
prehensive agenda. This agenda fits within the emerging field of “energy jus-
tice,” but forms a distinct subcomponent of it.16 Energy justice often spotlights
the injustices associated with traditional, fossil fuel energy sources,17 and the
need for electrification in developing nations.18 Clean energy justice focuses on
inequities in the energy system that may persist or worsen after sustainable en-
ergy becomes a driving goal.19
mental Justice Issues in Sustainable Development: Environmental Justice in the Renewable En-
ergy Transition, 19 J. ENVTL. SUSTAINABILITY L. 60 (2012) [hereinafter Outka,
Environmental Justice in Renewable Energy] (addressing the environmental justice implica-
tions of siting renewable energy by defining the concept legally, and discussing access to, and
inclusion in, green economy benefits).
15. Gwen Ottinger, The Winds of Change: Environmental Justice in Energy Transitions, 22 SCI.
AS CULTURE 222, 226 (2013).
16. See generally BENJAMIN SOVACOOL & MICHAEL DWORKIN, GLOBAL ENERGY JUSTICE:
PROBLEMS, PRINCIPLES, AND PRACTICES (2014) (exploring the potentially sweeping
dimensions of an international energy justice agenda).
17. See Shalanda H. Baker, Mexican Energy Reform, Climate Change, and Energy Justice in Indig-
enous Communities, 56 NAT. RESOURCES J. 369, 379 (2016); Karen Bickerstaff, Gordon
Walker & Harriet Bulkeley, Introduction to ENERGY JUSTICE IN A CHANGING CLIMATE:
SOCIAL EQUITY AND LOW-CARBON ENERGY 2 (Karen Bickerstaff et al. eds., 2013). Most
sources date the emergence of the academic literature on “energy justice” back only to 2013.
See, e.g., Kirsten Jenkins, Setting Energy Justice Apart from the Crowd: Lessons from Environ-
mental and Climate Justice, 39 ENERGY RES. SOC. SCI. 117, 117 (2018).
18. See Baker, supra note 17, at 382; Lakshman Guruswamy, Energy Justice and Sustainable De- R
velopment, 21 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 231, 255 (2010); see also Kandeh
Yumkella, Keynote Address, Energy Justice Conference, October 23, 2009, 21 COLO. J. INT’L
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 277, 279 (2010) (stating that energy justice “simply means access to
energy services to meet basic needs such as for cooking, heating, and preserving food”).
19. Energy justice is often presented as involving a “trilemma” of competing concerns: “energy
security, energy equity and environmental sustainability.” Alister Forman, Energy Justice at
the End of the Wire: Enacting Community Energy and Equity in Wales, 107 ENERGY POL’Y
649, 649 (2017); see also Raphael J. Heffron, Darren McCauley & Benjamin K. Sovacool,
Resolving Society’s Energy Trilemma through the Energy Justice Metric, 87 ENERGY POL’Y 168,
168 (2015). Several scholars have undertaken more targeted work on the topic of ensuring
affordability during the energy transition. See Rosie Day & Gordon Walker, Household En-
ergy Vulnerability as ‘Assemblage,’ in ENERGY JUSTICE IN A CHANGING CLIMATE: SOCIAL
EQUITY AND LOW-CARBON ENERGY, supra note 17, at 14–16, 24–25; Diana Herna´ndez, R
Sacrifice Along the Energy Continuum: A Call for Energy Justice, 8 ENVTL. JUST. 151, 154–55
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Framing a clean energy justice agenda also highlights its debts to, as well
as differences from, the traditional environmental justice agenda. Scholars ap-
proaching questions of clean energy and equity often approach them from an
environmental justice angle, examining how that movement might inform these
new debates.20 This approach is useful, as there is much to be learned from the
venerable history of the environmental justice movement—including the im-
portance of combining procedural and distributive justice concerns into a united
agenda.21
But a fuller exploration of clean energy justice illustrates that many of its
concerns implicate a different legal framework: energy law. By “energy law,” we
mean the laws and policies that govern the exploitation of energy resources and
the production and distribution of electricity.22 Generalizations about this body
of law are difficult, because the disparate doctrines that make it up developed
over more than a century, with different law and policy focuses in each era. At a
broad level, however, some observations are possible. Although scholars often
discuss a growing nexus between energy law and environmental law,23 there are
some critical differences. Many provisions of energy statutes are preoccupied
with economic regulation of monopolies and promotion of market solutions to
supply and demand.24 And the centrality of new technologies and geopolitical
events (such as oil crises) to the development of energy law has little parallel in
environmental law. We contend that some of these differences have a unique
impact on establishing a foundation for clean energy justice: The economic fo-
cus of energy law, and in particular, its history of attempting to ensure that
consumers are treated fairly, means that energy law pays more attention to dis-
tributive concerns than U.S. environmental statutes.25
Also unique to clean energy justice is a more insistent focus on potential
benefits: because it involves the growth of a new economy, the clean energy
transition offers the potential for more equally distributing the gains of this
(Aug. 2015); Tony Gerard Reames, Targeting Energy Justice: Exploring Spatial, Racial/Ethnic
and Socioeconomic Disparities in Urban Residential Heating Energy Efficiency, 97 ENERGY
POL’Y 549, 549 (2016) (using GIS to map fuel poverty in Kansas City, Missouri and recom-
mending community-based targeting of energy efficiency assistance programs); Benjamin K.
Sovacool, Fuel Poverty, Affordability, and Energy Justice in England: Policy Insights from the
Warm Front Program, 93 ENERGY 361, 362–64 (2015) (analyzing the ability of England’s
“Warm Front” program to reduce fuel poverty, cut greenhouse gas emissions, and increase
customer savings and satisfaction).
20. See generally Outka, Environmental Justice in Renewable Energy, supra note 14; Paben, supra R
note 13. R
21. See Kaswan, supra note 10, at 251–52. R
22. See JOEL B. EISEN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS, AND THE ENVIRONMENT: CASES AND
MATERIALS 1–29 (4th ed., 2015).
23. See, e.g., Alexandra B. Klass, Climate Change and the Convergence of Environmental and En-
ergy Law, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 180, 182 (2013).
24. An example of this, to which we return later, is the central command in both federal and
state electricity law that rates for power be “just and reasonable.” See infra Part II.
25. See infra Parts II & VI.A.
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burgeoning sector, as well as the harms.26 Conversely, procedural justice con-
cerns may be especially acute in the clean energy transition, as the deeply tech-
nocratic nature of energy law raises unique challenges to participation.27
Mapping more thoroughly clean energy justice’s unique landscape of upsides
and downsides helps to reveal creative legal and policy approaches, which we
discuss in Part VII. But this Article is only a first step in understanding this
complex terrain, and thus we conclude by identifying several questions in need
of scholarly attention.
A few caveats are in order. First, as energy law scholars approaching issues
of justice, we are distinctly attuned to the perils of losing or transforming the
voices of affected communities as we channel their concerns into academic,
analytical frames. We nevertheless hope that articulating the significant justice
challenges that we observe percolating into clean energy debates might help to
more thoroughly and rapidly incorporate these concerns into legal and policy
conversations.28 In performing this task, however, we do not profess to have
identified the full range of clean energy justice concerns that communities
across the United States are experiencing.
Second, the clean energy transition presents several additional justice-re-
lated challenges that we intentionally do not address here for reasons of space
and analytical clarity. We set aside the unique justice implications of pursuing
nuclear power as important but well explored.29 Two more novel issues that we
leave for separate discussions are the justice implications of transitioning away
from fossil fuels—and in particular, the question of duties owed to miners and
mining communities30—and the ways in which clean energy justice might in-
tersect with other climate justice concerns, including climate change’s inequita-
ble impacts on low-income and minority communities within and beyond the
26. In contrast to energy justice, environmental justice primarily focused at the outset on the
ways in which people of color and poor people are unequally exposed to environmental
harms. See Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental Protection: The Need for
Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619, 621 (1992). See generally ROBERT D.
BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (1990).
27. See infra Part V.
28. Cf. Marc R. Poirier, Environmental Justice/Racism/Equity: Can We Talk?, 96 W. VA. L. REV.
1083, 1103 (1993–1994) (observing how lawyerly and technocratic support can prove helpful
in the environmental justice context).
29. See Paben, supra note 13, at 1086; Valentina Vadi, Energy Security v. Public Health? Nuclear R
Energy in International Investment Law and Arbitration, 47 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1069, 1073
(2016).
30. Shalanda Baker et al., Beyond Zero-Sum Environmentalism, 47 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,328,
10,343–44 (2017) (discussing issues related to miners); Sanya Carley et al., Adaptation, Cul-
ture, and the Energy Transition in American Coal Country, 37 ENERGY RES. & SOC. SCI. 133,
138 (2018) (arguing for moving beyond a focus on coal jobs in these communities); Karl S.
Coplan, Fossil Fuel Abolition: Legal and Social Issues, 41 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 223, 262–64
(2016) (arguing no duty is owed to fossil fuel industries to protect stranded fossil fuel assets
against obsolescence); Annie Eisenberg, Just Transitions, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 101, 107
(2018) (surveying the literature on this topic).
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United States.31 These are worthy questions, but would lead us too far astray of
our focus on the particular equity implications that the rapid expansion of clean
energy raises. Finally, we also do not tackle the equity considerations associated
with carbon cap-and-trade programs. Although these programs engender sub-
stantial debate about equity concerns,32 we view these as separate from the more
embedded distributional consequences of policies aimed directly at promoting
clean energy.
II. WHY JUSTICE MATTERS IN THE TRANSITION TO CLEAN ENERGY
In this section, we consider why policymakers, scholars, and activists fo-
cused on clean energy should prioritize considerations of justice, and why those
focused on justice should prioritize clean energy. It is worth exploring this issue
carefully because for many, focusing on the justice implications of a clean en-
ergy transition may seem superfluous, or at least secondary. If we are moving
away from fossil fuels towards clean energy, aren’t we necessarily getting more
“just”?
The answer to this question depends on the aperture of your lens. To be
sure, movement towards clean energy helps to alleviate the challenge of climate
change, which harms the lowest income people most severely.33 And if fossil
fuel electricity generation is reduced, the communities that have borne the
brunt of its impacts should see improved health outcomes. Nevertheless, one
can imagine a clean energy transition that further concentrates wealth and
power in certain groups, while shunting off the burdens of new industrial infra-
structure to other, historically disadvantaged communities. Similarly, one can
imagine a clean energy transition that is insufficiently attentive to how the costs
of infrastructure change are distributed, thus exacerbating ongoing challenges
of energy poverty in the United States.34
31. See, e.g., Randall S. Abate & Elizabeth Ann Kronk, Commonality Among Unique Indigenous
Communities: An Introduction to Climate Change and Its Impacts on Indigenous Peoples, 26
TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 179, 180 (2013); Michael B. Gerrard, What Does Environmental Justice
Mean in an Era of Global Climate Change?, 19 J. ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY L. 278, 286
(2013) (“The single greatest adverse impact of climate change on poor populations around
the world is likely to be mass migration.”).
32. See, e.g., Richard Schmalensee & Robert N. Stavins, Lessons Learned from Three Decades of
Experience with Cap and Trade, 11 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 59, 67–69 (2017) (describ-
ing the “political pressures” to use auction revenues in California under the AB32 program);
LARA J. CUSHING ET AL., A PRELIMINARY ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY ASSESSMENT OF
CALIFORNIA’S CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM (2016), https://perma.cc/YDB9-5PHT (dis-
cussing localized pollution concerns with cap and trade).
33. Experts broadly agree that climate change will harm the poor within the United States more
than the affluent. See, e.g., U.S. NAT’L CLIMATE ASSESSMENT, HIGHLIGHTS: CLIMATE
CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES 34 (2014); ANTHONY LEISEROWITZ &
KAREN AKERLOF, YALE PROJECT ON CLIMATE CHANGE, RACE, ETHNICITY AND PUBLIC
RESPONSES TO CLIMATE CHANGE 4 (2010), https://perma.cc/778R-ZJD9.
34. See infra notes 45–48 and accompanying text. R
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When we talk about “justice” in this Article, it is not our intent to put
forth a specific definition of “clean energy justice,” nor to outline a definitive
theory of what would count as a “just” transition to clean energy. Instead, we
aim to highlight and analyze the myriad injustices that may arise in the clean
energy transition. We hope this articulation will provoke a broader conversation
about what should, and should not, be accepted as a “fair” outcome in a cleaner
energy society. In crafting our categories of concern, we draw on two concep-
tions of justice that are well developed in the existing literature: distributive
justice, which asks how the benefits and burdens of a policy or program should
be shared among a community, and procedural justice, which focuses on the
right to equal voice and representation during decisionmaking processes.35
Understanding the distributive consequences of the clean energy transi-
tion—and the procedural fairness of the institutions directing it—is critical in
part because of the accelerating pace of U.S. clean energy development. Taking
seriously the science and international commitments surrounding climate
change36 would require eighty percent decarbonization of the United States
economy by 2050, complete decarbonization by 2100,37 and electrifying the en-
tire economy. As a result, electricity consumption would have to double at the
same time that its production shifted entirely to carbon-free sources.38 This
would require U.S. renewable energy infrastructure to increase perhaps as much
as twenty times over.39
Our current political reality offers reason to doubt that such a rapid transi-
tion will occur. But even low-end estimates of renewable energy development
project a substantial increase in the next several decades. Under current state
legal commitments and present market dynamics—assuming no new policies
are adopted in the coming decades—the U.S. Energy Information Administra-
35. See, e.g., Robert R. Kuehn, A Taxonomy of Environmental Justice, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,681,
10,683–92 (2000).
36. Nations have agreed to limit planetary warming to two degrees Celsius to avert the worst
consequences of climate change. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report
of the Conference of the Parties on its Fifteenth Session, at 5, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/11/
Add.1 (Mar. 30, 2010) (reproducing the Copenhagen Accord of Dec. 18, 2009). Nations
have since committed to “pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above
pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of
climate change.” U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Adoption of the Paris
Agreement, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9 (Dec. 12, 2015).
37. JAMES H. WILLIAMS ET AL., ENERGY & ENTVL. ECON., INC., PATHWAYS TO DEEP
DECARBONIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2015), https://perma.cc/7VRN-3H5X.
38. Id. at xiv.
39. The total installed solar and wind capacity in the U.S. in March 2018 was 124 gigawatts
(GW). FERC, OFFICE OF ENERGY PROJECTS, ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE UPDATE FOR
MARCH 2018, at 6 (2018), https://perma.cc/H63K-E35P. In 2015, the Deep Decarboniza-
tion Pathways Project found that 80% decarbonization by 2050 will require “the deployment
of roughly 2,500 gigawatts (GW) of wind and solar generation,” or roughly 20 times the
2018 installed capacity. WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 37, at xiv; see also NAT’L RENEWABLE R
ENERGY LAB., supra note 8, at 19 (making similar findings). R
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tion projects that renewable energy will account for “64% of the total electric
generation growth” in the United States through 2050.40 Under this scenario,
wind power installations would increase by about twenty percent, while utility-
scale solar installation would more than double.41
In all likelihood, the scale of the transition will be somewhere between
current trends and deep-decarbonization-level projections. In any event, our
economy and society will transition to significantly more renewable energy in
the coming decades, and spending on renewable energy infrastructure will con-
tinue to rapidly increase.42 Therefore, if clean energy policies serve to redistrib-
ute wealth or power, they are likely to do so on a substantial scale.
In this section, we offer five reasons beyond the scale of the transition that
prioritizing justice is important, each of which might persuade a different set of
readers. In brief, we argue: (1) there is a moral case for continuing to ensure
widespread, affordable access to the foundational good of electricity during a
time of transition; (2) there is a formal, legal commitment to fairness within
utility law that regulators continue to apply as an important principle in energy
decisionmaking; (3) there are instrumental reasons why those in favor of clean
energy should join in common cause with those concerned about its justice
implications in order to move clean energy forward; (4) the technological trans-
formation required to decarbonize energy presents an opportunity to shift own-
ership and employment patterns; and (5) this transition also creates
opportunities to address structural and political inequality by giving communi-
ties and households more control over their energy supply. We develop these
points in turn.
First, there is a moral argument for paying attention to the distributive
impacts of clean energy policies. Although there is no constitutional right to
energy, it is foundational to participation in the modern economy and in mod-
ern communities.43 Energy’s importance has prompted every state in the coun-
40. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2018 WITH PROJECTIONS TO
2050, at 20 (projection in the reference case, incorporating assumptions described above).
41. Id. at 96 (“From 2020 to 2050, utility-scale wind capacity is projected to grow by 20
gigawatts (GW), and utility-scale solar photovoltaic capacity is projected to grow by 127
GW.”); Wind Energy Facts at a Glance, AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, https://perma.cc/FAU9-
GEJE (showing 96.5 GW operating currently); Solar Industry Research Data, SOLAR EN-
ERGY INDUSTRIES ASS’N, https://perma.cc/ELK7-CT8Y (showing approximately 60 GW
operating currently).
42. See, e.g., BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY FIN., NEW ENERGY OUTLOOK 2017, at 4 (June 15,
2017), https://perma.cc/AL8V-M5V4 (predicting $1.5 trillion in investment in renewables
in the Americas between 2017–2040, including $10 billion per year in PV solar).
43. EISEN ET AL., supra note 22, at 5) (noting that “modern life as we know it would be impossi-
ble without large quantities of electricity”); cf. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 62
(1971) (describing “primary goods” that “every rational man is presumed to want”).
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try to designate its electricity providers as “public utilities,” each governed by a
“public utility commission” (“PUC”) that sets the rates they can charge.44
Yet tens of millions of Americans still live in energy poverty, which is
often measured in terms of households that must spend more than 6% of in-
come on energy bills.45 This measure—while useful—understates the problem:
In several places in the country, “energy expenditures breach 50 percent of
household incomes.”46 Although some federal programs subsidize energy bills,
low funding levels mean that only 20–22% of eligible Americans actually re-
ceive federal funding assistance.47 And the problem appears to be worsening,
with many states reporting increasing numbers of residents losing electricity
due to non-payment of utility bills.48
Given the persistent challenges of providing affordable electricity to
Americans, there is good reason to insist that clean energy not exacerbate en-
ergy poverty. That’s not to say it will. Many predict that we can dramatically
clean up the U.S. grid without having much of an upward impact on energy
prices—and that the concomitant gains in health might more than account for
any additional costs associated with clean energy.49 If that’s the case, so much
the better—but we should at least be carefully tracking the distributional impli-
44. EISEN ET AL., supra note 22, at 77–79 (describing the basic elements of public utility regula-
tion); id. at 455–60 (describing rate regulation by PUCs); see also William C. Boyd & Ann
Carlson, Accidents of Federalism: Ratemaking and Policy Innovation in Public Utility Law, 63
UCLA L. REV. 810 (2016). See generally William C. Boyd, Public Utility and the Low Car-
bon Future, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1614 (2014) (discussing the historical origins of public utility
law and its applicability to electric grid decarbonization). In the nineteen states that have
partially or fully implemented “retail competition,” some aspects are “fully regulated by the
states, and others are governed by new, market-oriented regimes.” EISEN ET AL., supra note
22, at 699–708 (describing states’ retail competition efforts).
45. See Shelley Welton, Grid Modernization and Energy Poverty, 18 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 565
(2017); Dan Boyce & Jordan Wirfs-Brock, High Utility Costs Force Hard Decisions for the
Poor, INSIDE ENERGY (May 8, 2016), https://perma.cc/9W44-CH3U; see also Adam Chan-
dler, Where the Poor Spend More Than 10 Percent of Their Income on Energy, ATLANTIC (June
8, 2016), https://perma.cc/NXG9-GK5Z; Michael Isaac Stein, The Uneven Gains of Energy
Efficiency, WIRED (Feb. 13, 2018), https://perma.cc/NM7C-QNFG (describing how a fac-
tor in energy poverty is that “low-end housing is significantly less energy-efficient than other
housing stock”).
46. Chandler, supra note 45. R
47. See Boyce & Wirfs-Brock, supra note 45 (citing research by the Congressional Research R
Service on the Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program); KETURAH A. BROWN,
JOINT CTR. FOR POLITICAL & ECON. STUDIES, ENSURING ENERGY FOR LOW-INCOME
HOUSEHOLDS OF COLOR 2 (2017), https://perma.cc/B2AX-7US8 (“LIHEAP funding is
inadequate. Only 20 percent of the households eligible for LIHEAP actually receive energy
assistance.”).
48. See Jim Polson, More Americans Are Getting Their Electricity Cut Off, BLOOMBERG BUS.
(Oct. 13, 2017), https://perma.cc/R4LW-7TRG. According to one consumer group, “10
percent to 15 percent of people who are disconnected never get reconnected.” Id.
49. The Deep Decarbonization Pathways Project conservatively estimates that the costs of 80%
decarbonization of the grid range from negative $90 billion to $730 billion in 2050, compris-
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cations of the clean energy transition to understand whether these universal
gains are materializing. Rosy predictions alone cannot pay the electricity bills of
those forced to choose between “heating and eating.”50
Of course, we recognize that some readers may not be persuaded by moral
arguments alone—or may think that parsing “energy poverty” from the general
challenges of poverty is not a useful intervention. But one need not accept an
internal moral imperative to address energy poverty to find the issue salient,
because the relevant regulators already care. That is to say, there is a formal,
legal argument for paying attention to clean energy justice that arises from the
structure of energy law, which is comprised predominantly of Progressive-Era
statutory frameworks that have endured into modern times. We contend that
these Progressive roots result in a set of laws that is considerably more attuned
to justice considerations than environmental law. These laws, in turn, make
energy regulators responsive to arguments framed in terms of justice or fairness.
The United States’ overarching framework for regulating electricity exists
in the public utility laws referenced above.51 States enacted these framework
statutes in the early 1900s and 1910s, during the height of the Progressive
Era.52 The structure and language of these laws thus reflect the substantial pre-
occupation that Progressive Era intellectuals had with considerations of justice
and economic power.53 Public utility statutes speak of “universal service,” “just
and reasonable” prices, and “nondiscrimination” in energy access at both the
state and federal levels.54 Even after decades of movement in energy law away
ing somewhere around 0.8% of GDP. WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 37, at xiii. That calcula- R
tion does not include health benefits from reducing reliance on fossil fuels. Id.
50. See Sovacool, supra note 19, at 362 (quoting Jonathan Bradshaw & Sandra Hutton, Social
Policy Options and Fuel Poverty, 3 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 249, 249 (1983)); see also Sovacool &
Dworkin, supra note 16, at 231–32 (reporting income concentration related to energy con-
sumption for various countries including the United States).
51. See EISEN ET AL., supra note 22 and accompanying text.
52. New York and Wisconsin passed the first state public utility statutes in 1907. Boyd, supra
note 44, at 1640. Public utility laws remain the central framework for utility rate regulation R
today. EISEN ET AL., supra note 22, at 456.
53. See William C. Boyd, Essay, Just Price, Public Utility, and the Long History of Economic Regu-
lation in America, 35 YALE J. ON REG. 721, 729–49 (2018) (discussing the origins of “just
and reasonable” pricing and grounding them in considerations of justice dating back centu-
ries); Boyd, supra note 44. Railroads’ economic power motivated rate regulation, which R
served as a model for public utility laws. Boyd, supra note 44, at 1639–40; Joel B. Eisen, R
FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1783,
1797–806 (2016) [hereinafter Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric
Grid].
54. See EISEN ET AL., supra note 22, at 78–79 (discussing key aspects of public utility regula-
tion); Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, supra note 53, at R
1812 (discussing the historical origins of “undue discrimination”); Douglas N. Jones & Pat-
rick C. Mann, The Fairness Criterion in Public Utility Regulation: Does Fairness Still Matter?,
35 J. ECON. ISSUES 153, 158–59 (2001) (listing these and additional concepts within public
utility regulation that have to do with “fairness”).
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from direct price regulation and toward more market-based mechanisms for
controlling prices,55 “fairness” remains a central concern of energy regulators.56
For this reason, arguments that raise fairness concerns gain traction in front of
these regulators—a point we return to below.57
Because of these origins, energy law may prove a substantially more useful
tool than environmental law for addressing distributional concerns. Indeed, the
histories of environmental and energy law diverge here in important ways. In
his 2017 article The Long Environmental Justice Movement, Jedediah Purdy con-
textualizes an observation long apparent to environmental justice scholars and
advocates: U.S. environmental law, at least as institutionalized in the 1970s and
early 1980s, is strikingly unconcerned with matters of equality, or the distribu-
tion of benefits and harms.58 Purdy suggests the predominant reason for envi-
ronmental law’s justice lacuna is the timing of modern U.S. environmental law’s
birth. As Purdy argues, the United States adopted its major environmental stat-
utes during a time when “economic inequality was a problem [that appeared to
be] substantially solved,” which “supported a certain complacency about the
distributional consequences of environmental law.”59 This embedded compla-
cency has led to heartaches and dead ends in trying to use these laws to prevent
unequal burdens of environmental pollution. Environmental law’s shortcomings
feel all the more acute now that we understand mid-century trends towards
greater equality as anomalous rather than preordained.60 In contrast, energy
law’s long-standing commitments to fair distribution and equal access create
space in which to construct legal arguments in favor of some elements of energy
justice—a point we develop in Part VI.
There is yet a third reason to be concerned about clean energy justice, even
if one is unmoved by either moral pleas or formalist fairness commitments:
instrumentalism. At the moment, large utilities and their allies dominate clean
energy proceedings, with predictable results: Utilities use equity arguments—
55. See generally Emily Hammond & David B. Spence, The Regulatory Contract in the Market-
place, 69 VAND. L. REV. 141 (2016).
56. Jones & Mann, supra note 54, at 167 (finding that even as utility regulators have increasingly R
employed markets to manage prices, 58% of utility regulators continue to prioritize fairness
over efficiency in regulatory decisionmaking); see also Darryl Biggar, Fairness in Public-utility
Regulation: A Theory, 17 AGENDA: J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & REFORM 5, 5 (2010) (“Regulators
routinely and systematically depart from policy prescriptions that are soundly based in con-
ventional economic theory. In doing so, they often appeal to notions of fairness, justice, or
reasonableness.”). For several recent examples of PUC Commissioners raising fairness con-
cerns in clean energy proceedings, see infra Part II.
57. See Alexandra B. Klass, Regulating the Energy “Free Riders,” 100 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming
2019); see also Troy Rule, Solar Energy, Utilities, and Fairness, 6 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE &
ENERGY L. 115, 125 (2015) (observing how utilities exploit fairness arguments in rooftop
solar compensation debates).
58. Purdy, supra note 10, at 813–14. R
59. Id. at 815–16.
60. Id. See generally THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2013)
(discussing the profound wealth inequalities currently prevailing).
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about who pays for clean energy and who benefits from it—as a lever against
pursuing ambitious clean energy goals. They contend that policies like retail-
rate-level compensation for rooftop solar energy, or ratepayer funding for smart
grid investments, cross-subsidize richer ratepayers (who are best able to take
advantage of new technologies) at the expense of lower-income ones.61 Con-
sumer advocates—the presumed “voice of the people” in utility proceedings—
often echo these concerns, focusing on keeping present-day rates as low as pos-
sible.62 These arguments typically ignore the many ways in which clean energy
benefits all consumers, making the equity tradeoffs of clean energy more com-
plex than utilities would have regulators believe.63
This oversight creates room to forge alliances capable of defeating self-
serving or shortsighted utility arguments grounded in justice or fairness. A
clean energy justice agenda gives clean energy advocates the ability to find com-
mon cause with advocates focused on issues of poverty, economic power, and
social and racial justice. These are, of course, many of the same alliances that
environmentalists of the 1970s and 1980s failed to foster, precipitating the en-
vironmental justice movement.64 Clean energy advocates can avoid the same
decades-long mistake by partnering with groups focused on economic and ra-
cial justice to forge a common agenda to push back against utility antipathy to
clean energy.65 To create and maintain these partnerships, however, will require
clean energy advocates to ensure that clean energy policies do not in fact
threaten justice in the ways that utilities claim. In other words, these advocates
will have to embrace the goal of clean energy justice.
The three arguments this section has sketched so far—moral, formal, and
instrumental—provide reasons that those who care about clean energy should
pay close attention to its justice implications. The final two arguments invert
this relationship, examining why those focused on economic and social justice
might find particular reasons to care about clean energy policy.
The first argument relates to the nature of the transition: Clean energy’s
rise presents a moment of striking technological change, centering on a series of
technological advances potentially as significant as the computer revolution.66
This rapidly shifting technological landscape includes new and different kinds
of large-scale power facilities, small-scale distributed generation, vehicles,
61. See infra Part III.A.
62. See infra notes 228–230 and accompanying text. R
63. See Shelley Welton, Clean Electrification, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 571, 576 (2017) [hereinafter
Welton, Clean Electrification] (explaining the tensions between addressing climate change
and ensuring present-day affordability that energy regulators face).
64. Purdy argues that environmental justice has a longer arc, and that early twentieth century
activists saw these issues as more unified. Nevertheless, the later twentieth century “Environ-
mental Agenda” “represented the consolidation of the environmental movement into a par-
ticular [white, upper-middle class] version of itself . . . .” Purdy, supra note 10, at 850. R
65. See infra Part IV.
66. See Joel B. Eisen, Smart Regulation and Federalism for the Smart Grid, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 1, 2–3 (2013) [hereinafter Eisen, Smart Regulation and Federalism for the Smart Grid].
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thermostats, communication devices, and energy storage. Incumbent utilities
and new energy technology entrants are already battling over who should con-
trol the markets and services emerging in the changing energy sector.
The range, scale, and uncertainty of outcomes associated with technologi-
cal changes sets clean energy justice concerns apart from environmental justice
ones, because clean energy creates entire new industries that could be used as
vehicles to alleviate inequality. But the “incumbents/new entrants” framing has
meant that most conversations about managing the distributive consequences of
new technologies proceed from this divide—with little attention to characteris-
tics that might distinguish one new entrant from another in ways that are
meaningful for justice considerations. Two of the many examples are standard
setting for electric grid interoperability, which proceeded in a byzantine process
without a mechanism for attention to justice concerns,67 and the governance
structures of regional transmission organizations (“RTOs”) that operate the
grid and conduct markets (to which we devote more attention below).68
To couple technological advances and clean energy justice will require
care, as technology revolutions often do not produce greater equality. Quite the
contrary, such advances often consolidate power, wealth, and influence: con-
sider, for example, Amazon’s and Google’s growth and dominance.69 But in the
utility sphere, where century-old monopolies hold substantial sway, technologi-
cal changes could shift the balance of power in productive ways. Conversations
about transformative energy technologies can broaden to include larger ques-
tions about how opportunities to own and operate these new technologies
should be distributed—and even to inform the broader scholarly conversation
about how the law can and should grapple with rapid technological change.70
These points about the distribution of the benefits of technological inno-
vation relate to a broader concern about growing inequality in the United
States. We are in a moment of profound and growing concentration of wealth
in the hands of very few persons, with limited benefits accruing to the vast
majority of people who find themselves in the middle or lower class.71 At the
same time, democracy seems to have entered a period of distrust, if not de-
67. See generally id. (discussing this process).
68. See infra Part IV.
69. See Marc Perrone, ‘Walmart on Steroids’: Beware of Amazon’s Growing Monopoly, HILL (Aug.
21, 2017), https://perma.cc/W73E-J7MF; Jonathan Taplin, Is It Time to Break Up Google?,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2017), https://perma.cc/8XLL-QYQ4; Danny Vinik, Inside the New
Battle against Google, POLITICO (Sept. 17, 2017), https://perma.cc/AU7B-PP7J.
70. See, e.g., CONSTITUTION 3.0: FREEDOM AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE (Jeffrey Rosen
and Benjamin Wittes eds., 2013) (collecting different visions of how to preserve constitu-
tional values in times of rapid technological change).
71. See generally PIKETTY, supra note 60; Matthew Stewart, The 9.9 Percent Is the New American R
Aristocracy, ATLANTIC (June 2018), https://perma.cc/3JX4-PRLT (discussing the concentra-
tion of wealth and privilege in the “new aristocracy” and barriers to upward mobility into the
wealthier classes); GANESH SITARAMAN, THE CRISIS OF THE MIDDLE-CLASS CONSTITU-
TION: WHY ECONOMIC INEQUALITY THREATENS OUR REPUBLIC (2017).
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cline.72 These trends in combination have prompted many scholars to call for
renewed attention to pragmatic ideas for tackling economic inequality in the
United States, which could operate beyond the ballot box or legislatures.73
The clean energy transition might be one place to look for solutions in this
regard, given the scale of the changes in infrastructure and technology that it
portends.74 As we discuss more fully below, community ownership arrange-
ments and the ability to “exit” utility service may provide forms of community
economic empowerment that give localities and households newfound leverage
against powerful corporate interests.75 But such arrangements will only come to
exist where sufficient pressure is put upon legislators and regulators to open up
the century-old paradigm of monopoly utilities.
Altogether, there are myriad reasons that those pushing for a rapid transi-
tion to clean energy, as well as those focused on growing inequality, should pay
careful attention to clean energy’s justice implications. Having made this case,
we now delve into what these justice implications may be.
III. WHO PAYS? FUNDING THE CLEAN ENERGY TRANSITION
We begin our analysis of clean energy justice with attention to who pays
for the transition. This question sets clean energy justice apart from environ-
mental justice, which largely does not involve the distributional consequences of
economic expenditures.76 Although many unknowns remain regarding the path
to full decarbonization, transforming our electric grid from reliance on fossil
72. Particularly since the 2016 presidential election, there has been considerable commentary
about the decline of democratic institutions in the United States and beyond. See, e.g., Max
Fisher & Amanda Taub, Is There Something Wrong with Democracy?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24,
2018), https://perma.cc/H6N9-HBW7. See generally STEVEN LIVITSKY & DANIEL
ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE (2018). The Economist’s Democracy Index 2016 found
that the United States has become a “flawed democracy,” attributing the decline to a “contin-
ued erosion of trust in government and elected officials,” and not specifically to the election
of President Donald Trump. Declining Trust in Government Is Denting Democracy, ECONO-
MIST (Jan. 25, 2017), https://perma.cc/3NUE-AHR5.
73. See, e.g., TIMOTHY NOAH, THE GREAT DIVERGENCE: AMERICA’S GROWING INEQUALITY
CRISIS AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 181 (2013) (proposing such measures as substi-
tuting carbon taxes and value-added taxes for payroll taxes that he believes are regressive);
SITARAMAN, supra note 71, at 298–99 (proposing such measures as campaign finance laws, R
implementation of compulsory voting, and restrictions on lobbying activities).
74. Of course, clean energy will not provide a comprehensive solution to inequality, and there
are many debates to be had about the roles of important social determinants of success such
as family inheritance, social connections, and structural discrimination. See, e.g., Stewart,
supra note 71. R
75. See infra notes 165–168 and accompanying text (discussing community solar), and notes R
315–317 and accompanying text (discussing leverage provided by “community choice aggre- R
gation” models).
76. See Lazarus, supra note 10, at 790 (explaining that the environmental justice movement does
not focus on the “regressive distribution of the economic costs associated with pollution
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLE\43-2\HLE202.txt unknown Seq: 18  3-JUL-19 9:37
324 Harvard Environmental Law Review [Vol. 43
fuels to clean energy will require billions or even trillions of dollars in new
investments.77
We would need something akin to the New Deal or moon-landing pro-
gram to completely replace fossil fuels with clean energy—which, even given
the increasing attention to the idea of a “Green New Deal,” is not on the cur-
rent federal agenda. To be sure, federal tax credits have spurred rapid growth in
utility-scale investments in solar and wind power,78 and federal regulators have
taken some steps to make markets fairer to clean energy resources.79 Neverthe-
less, state policies drive most clean energy expenditures.
States’ clean energy programs are curious creatures because they do not
rely predominantly on state revenue for funding. Instead, most are funded
through payments by consumers to their utilities—that is to say, all of us pay
for them in our capacity as “ratepayers.” Thus, to understand who pays, one
must understand how electricity rate structures channel clean energy funding
into monthly electricity bills. We consider two ways in which clean energy in-
vestments affect individual consumers’ bills: (1) net metering programs, a popu-
lar form of state incentive for rooftop solar; and (2) added charges for capital
expenditures or programs proposed by utilities and approved by state legisla-
tures and PUCs for “grid modernization,” and accompanying movement to-
wards novel pricing structures for electricity.
We focus on these initiatives because they directly shift costs among vari-
ous groups of energy consumers—and thus most obviously raise distributional
control,” but rather on “the prevalence of hazardous pollutants in the communities where
they live and work”).
77. See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 37, at xii (estimating that the median expected incremental
energy system costs associated with decarbonization—that is, the costs above and beyond
business as usual energy infrastructure development—are around $300 billion in 2050); see
also Rachel Cleetus, Alison Bailie & Steve Clemmer, The U.S. Power Sector in a Net Zero
World: Analyzing Pathways for Deep Carbon Reductions 9 (Union of Concerned Scientists,
Working Paper, 2016), https://perma.cc/2WHL-LPXT (finding that the investments
needed to decarbonize the electricity sector “will need to reach nearly $250 billion per year”
over the next 35 years, excluding research, development, and demonstration costs (emphasis
added)).
78. Felix Mormann, Beyond Tax Credits: Smarter Tax Policy for a Cleaner, More Democratic En-
ergy Future, 31 YALE J. ON REG. 303, 308 (2014).
79. Reforms to promote clean energy include the recent order on storage technologies, the path-
breaking order on demand response compensation, and the order on frequency regulation in
ancillary markets. See Electric Storage Participation in Markets Operated by Regional
Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators, 83 Fed. Reg. 9580 (Mar.
6, 2018) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35); Frequency Regulation Compensation in the Organ-
ized Wholesale Power Markets, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,260 (Oct. 20, 2011) (codified at 18 C.F.R.
pt. 35); Demand Response Compensation in Organized Wholesale Energy Markets, 76 Fed.
Reg. 16,657 (Mar. 24, 2011) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35). But see Danny Cullenward &
Shelley Welton, The Quiet Undoing: How Regional Electricity Market Reforms Threaten State
Clean Energy Goals, 36 YALE J. ON REG. BULL. 106, 121–28 (2018) (describing how FERC
and certain RTOs are reforming capacity markets in ways that threaten clean energy
progress).
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concerns. Of course, all clean energy policies—including tax credits, renewable
portfolio standards, and cap-and-trade programs—have distributional conse-
quences, some of which are potentially regressive.80 Nevertheless, policies that
work through the state taxing power, or through generalized fees that apply to
all grid-connected consumers, have more attenuated distributive consequences
than the ones examined here.
An important theme unites the justice concerns related to net metering
and grid modernization. Both policies serve the larger goal of a more distrib-
uted, flexible grid, where consumers participate in how electricity is made,
moved, and managed.81 But as electricity consumers become electricity produc-
ers, through adopting rooftop solar, electricity storage, or other emerging tech-
nologies, funding a massive clean energy buildout through electricity bills—at
least as they are currently structured—may come to feel less fair. As technolo-
gies like rooftop solar reach significant levels of penetration, care will need to be
taken to ensure that the costs of the grid are not unfairly shunted onto non-
participants, who are more likely to be low-income and persons of color.82 Oth-
erwise, justice concerns may either stall the clean energy transition, or force a
more fundamental rethinking of the predominant model of ratepayer-funded
clean energy infrastructure.
A. Net Metering and the “Cross-Subsidization” Question
Individual consumers have tremendous power to help drive the clean en-
ergy transition by installing their own on-site energy systems—which are re-
ferred to as “distributed generation.” This decentralized, bottom-up activity is
often lauded as a primary benefit of clean energy, in contrast to our current
reliance on centralized power plants. States promote distributed generation
with incentives or tax breaks to bring down the cost of solar panels, and renew-
able portfolio standards that include a requirement that utilities obtain a spe-
cific percentage of their supply from distributed energy resources.83
None of these policies, however, have been as influential in driving the
proliferation of rooftop solar as net metering, which thirty-eight states currently
allow.84 Net metering allows rooftop solar owners to export energy to the elec-
80. See, e.g., Laurent Belsie, How Regressive is a Price on Carbon?, NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RES.
(Jan. 2010), https://perma.cc/9YKN-NQR5 (arguing that both cap-and-trade programs and
carbon taxes are regressive).
81. See generally Welton, Clean Electrification, supra note 63. R
82. See infra note 157 and accompanying text (documenting net metering participation by R
income).
83. See Joel B. Eisen, Residential Renewable Energy: By Whom?, 31 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 339,
345 (2011); Welton, Social Project, supra note 6, at 1082; DSIRE DATABASE, supra note 4 R
and accompanying text (listing the various programs for each state).
84. See LORI BIRD ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., REGULATORY CONSIDERA-
TIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE EXPANDED ADOPTION OF DISTRIBUTED SOLAR 33 (2013)
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tricity grid and contemporaneously “run their electricity meter backwards”
whenever their solar panels make more electricity than their house needs, effec-
tively valuing excess solar-generated electricity at the customer retail rate. This
straightforward compensation mechanism appeals to homeowners who can eas-
ily understand the benefits that a net-metered rooftop solar system provides;
net metering has prompted a solar rush in many states.85
As successful and important as net metering has been in driving a dramatic
growth in solar installations nationwide, it has also created equity concerns.
There are few programs tailored to lower-income consumers, or for that matter,
anyone without a suitable roof on a house that they own or those who rent
housing.86 Not surprisingly, then, solar adopters tend to be higher-income
homeowners.87
This division between solar haves and have-nots has sparked dozens of
debates across the nation about whether compensating solar generators at the
full retail rate works to the disadvantage of those utility customers who lack
their own solar systems. In many states, the debate has taken place in the con-
text of a utility’s request to a PUC that the amounts paid to net metering cus-
tomers be lowered, in some cases dramatically. Utilities have seized upon the
“cross-subsidization” argument in these proceedings to justify slowing or halt-
ing incentives for clean energy—which would particularly benefit their bottom
line.88 On the flip side, many studies suggest that net metering’s retail-level
compensation for customer-generated power actually undercompensates solar
(noting that at the end of 2012, 99% of installed solar PV was on net metering tariffs);
DSIRE DATABASE, supra note 4. R
85. This rush has since slowed, although rooftop solar continues to grow. See Ivan Penn, Rooftop
Solar Installations Rising but Pace of Growth Falls, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2017), https://per
ma.cc/FQB6-3KQH (“U.S. rooftop solar installations increased 19% in 2016 compared with
an average growth of 63% year-over-year from 2012 to 2015.”).
86. CTR. FOR SOC. INCLUSION, GRID ALTERNATIVES & VOTE SOLAR, LOW-INCOME SO-
LAR POLICY GUIDE 9 (2016) https://perma.cc/3JTQ-VWTY (reviewing barriers to partici-
pating in solar programs for residents in multi-unit buildings or homes with shared roofs).
87. Ben Sigrin, Jacquelyn Pless & Easan Drury, Diffusion into New Markets: Evolving Customer
Segments in the Solar Photovoltaics Market, 10 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS, Aug. 2015, at 1 (find-
ing that solar adopters overall are higher-income and better educated in a study of over 2,000
households in San Diego, California).
88. See Mark Muro & Devashree Saha, Rooftop Solar: Net Metering Is a Net Benefit, BROOKINGS
(May 23, 2016), https://perma.cc/XH6X-R4DJ (discussing numerous studies conducted by
state PUCs and nonprofit groups). Some PUCs, such as those in Nevada and Louisiana,
have concluded that net metering shifts costs to customers who do not use it. See Shalanda
Baker, Unlocking the Energy Commons: Expanding Community Energy Generation, in LAW
AND POLICY FOR A NEW ECONOMY 5 (Melissa K. Scanlan ed., 2017). Utilities consistently
argue that increased penetrations of distributed solar could lead to lower revenues. See, e.g.,
PETER KIND, ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE ADVOCATES, DISRUPTIVE CHALLENGES: FI-
NANCIAL IMPLICATIONS AND STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO A CHANGING RETAIL ELEC-
TRIC BUSINESS 13 (2013).
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panel owners for the benefits of integrating decentralized clean energy into the
grid, as distributed solar improves reliability and lowers transmission and distri-
bution costs.89
There is some merit to the argument that extending the net metering in-
centive to first movers leaves others to foot the bill for the fixed costs of the
utility’s operations, since many costs are recovered through the volumetric rates
that net metering lowers.90 What remains in dispute is whether net metering
also lowers these fixed costs enough to make it a good deal for non-participants.
And the answer to this question depends on a state’s particular context, includ-
ing the rate of solar penetration, the structure of utility bills, and the nature of
local grid dispatch, such that it varies state to state and shifts over time.91
Still, at the present moment, the empirics of net metering suggest that the
equity arguments against it are often a smokescreen for more generalized utility
resistance to a new technology they do not control.92 Nevertheless, the potential
for class-based cost shifting is worthy of attention. Until recently, the mecha-
nisms in most state programs for dealing with this potential cross-subsidization
were rudimentary, such as overall program caps that limited the total capacity of
eligible systems. But these caps were designed more to constrain the overall
impact on the utility than to limit impacts on lower-income ratepayers. Often,
states found themselves expanding the caps when the programs proved popular
and when solar panel and installation costs fell, without revisiting the underly-
ing issues or making any assessment of the expanded programs’ impacts on
non-subsidized ratepayers.
More recently, recognizing that net metering is a blunt tool for accurately
compensating rooftop solar, several states have embarked on “value-of-solar”
proceedings to quantify the value of distributed solar to the grid.93 A value-of-
89. Muro and Saha conclude that there is “substantial evidence that net metering is more often
than not a net benefit to the grid and all ratepayers.” Muro & Saha, supra note 88.
90. See id. (“If rates go too far in the direction of ‘volumetric energy charges’—charging custom-
ers based on energy use—utilities could have trouble recovering costs when distributed en-
ergy sources reach higher levels of penetration.”).
91. See generally GALEN BARBOSE, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., LBNL-1007060, PUT-
TING THE POTENTIAL RATE IMPACTS OF DISTRIBUTED SOLAR INTO CONTEXT (2017);
PAUL DENHOLM ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., NREL/TP-6A20-62447,
METHODS FOR ANALYZING THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF DISTRIBUTED PHOTOVOL-
TAIC GENERATION TO THE U.S. ELECTRIC UTILITY SYSTEM (2014) (discussing the many
factors involved in this calculation); see also Muro & Saha, supra note 88 (supporting the
same).
92. Muro & Saha, supra note 88.
93. The first state to do so was Minnesota. JOHN FARRELL, INST. FOR LOCAL SELF-RELI-
ANCE, CAN A NORTHERN STATE’S NEW SOLAR POLICY DEFUSE DISTRIBUTED GENERA-
TION BATTLES? MINNESOTA’S VALUE OF SOLAR, at i (2014). The state’s methodology is
explained at DIV. OF ENERGY RES., MINN. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MINNESOTA VALUE OF
SOLAR: METHODOLOGY (2014), https://perma.cc/F6D7-P8KX.
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solar tariff calculates solar’s true benefits and costs, factoring in environmental,
employment, and grid impacts based on the costs utilities avoid by having solar
on the system in light of projected future demand.94 By compensating rooftop
solar providers at this precise rate, value-of-solar tariffs eliminate arguments
that rooftop solar policies are punitive to those who cannot install their own
panels. That said, they do not directly address justice concerns regarding une-
qual participation in rooftop solar by class or race. We take up this question of
unequal rooftop solar adoption in the next part, after exploring how challenges
regarding “who pays” have also plagued efforts at grid modernization.
B. Grid Modernization
“Grid modernization” has become a significant trend in the utility industry
in the last decade. It, too, raises substantial questions about who is paying, and
for what benefits. Grid modernization is a popular term for legislative and reg-
ulatory actions to transform the aging electric grid into the grid of the future.
Across the nation, PUCs are grappling with whether to authorize their utilities
to undertake the billions of dollars of expenditures necessary to “modernize” the
grid.95
Grid modernization means different things in different states. State legis-
latures and PUCs are considering a host of advanced technologies that promote
clean energy (such as smart meters and associated infrastructure, energy storage,
microgrids and demand response) and other projects designed to make the grid
more resilient, responsive and interactive (such as investments in new transmis-
sion lines and digital components on the grid).96 Questions abound in these
proceedings about the benefits these investments will bring, and whether they
are cost-justified. Here, we focus on a subset of these questions: whether it is
fair to make all ratepayers split the cost of grid modernization investments.
Venerable principles of state utility rate regulation, which aim to curb mo-
nopoly abuses and ensure just and reasonable rates, govern this decision. In
most states, this leads PUCs to calculate the rates that utilities can charge their
customers by first deciding on the utilities’ “revenue requirements,” that is, the
amount they must take in to continue operating. These revenue requirements
94. BARBOSE, supra note 91, at 9. At times, this methodology results in a higher rate for distrib- R
uted solar: for example, Minnesota’s proceeding “affirmed that distributed solar generation is
worth more than its retail price and concluded that net metering undervalues rooftop solar,”
and Maine reached a similar result. See Muro & Saha, supra note 88.
95. See, e.g., Herman K. Trabish, Grid Mod Policy Actions Jump 75%, With Storage Playing A
Central Role, UTILITYDIVE (June 5, 2018), https://perma.cc/J3ZU-75U4 (reporting rapid
growth in grid modernization proposals between 2017 and 2018, concentrated in thirty-
seven states).
96. See generally N.C. CLEAN ENERGY TECH. CTR., 50 STATES OF GRID MODERNIZATION:
Q2 2017 QUARTERLY REPORT (2017), https://perma.cc/DNL2-AEDT (noting that over
half of the states are engaged in grid modernization proceedings).
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are then translated into the fixed and per-kilowatt hour fees for energy that we
all receive on our monthly bills.
The nature of grid modernization proceedings has led many to object to
such investments on grounds related to justice. Most often, these concerns fo-
cus on the large amount of up-front spending—and therefore, rate increases—
that such proposals require, in exchange for long-term and potentially uncertain
benefits.97 For example, installing a smart meter in every house may be a wise
long-term investment if a PUC ultimately transitions all consumers to time-of-
use rates,98 and if rooftop solar, electric vehicles, and home energy storage pro-
liferate. Otherwise, a state might regret mandating their rollout. Moreover,
many question the fairness of using ratepayer funding to initiate a series of grid
transformations that may well inure to the benefit of the wealthy while harming
lower-income consumers. Critics worry that pricing changes that reward con-
sumers for shifting their time of consumption might harm low-income and
elderly consumers, since these groups might be least able to afford the technol-
ogies necessary to monitor and shift demand.99
These objections have received only limited consideration by PUC com-
missioners. To be sure, commissions are finely attuned to the question of
whether grid modernization efforts are “worth it”—because a calculation of the
future benefits of smart grid investments helps to determine whether the costs
meet the legal standard of “just and reasonable” and can be passed on to con-
sumers. But PUCs less frequently take notice of how grid modernization ex-
penditures might impact different classes of consumers, particularly as
technological investments impel novel pricing structures.
However, some commissions have begun to confront these distributive
justice questions within grid modernization. For example, the Maryland Public
Service Commission initially rejected a utility’s “Smart Grid Initiative” in part
because “some of the Company’s most vulnerable residential customers . . . are
less likely to realize the potential benefits of [time-of-use] pricing than would
97. See, e.g., Dave Ress, Va. Legislation Calls for Bigger Dominion Energy Refund, but Does it Lock
in Higher Rates?, DAILY PRESS (Feb. 6, 2018) (quoting various objections to potential higher
rates from Dominion’s grid modernization effort). Based on the limited evidence from grid
modernization laws that have gone into effect, the concern about potential rate increases is
warranted. Ann McCabe, Orjit Ghosal & Bill Peters, A Formula for Grid Modernization?,
PUB. UTIL. FORTNIGHTLY (May 2016), https://perma.cc/Z2UD-24YP (noting that Illinois’
grid modernization law has resulted in rate increases that have outpaced inflation).
98. See Welton, Grid Modernization and Energy Poverty, supra note 45, at 575–76; Eisen, Smart R
Regulation and Federalism for the Smart Grid, supra note 66, at 18–20. R
99. AARP ET AL., THE NEED FOR ESSENTIAL CONSUMER PROTECTIONS: SMART METER-
ING PROPOSALS AND THE MOVE TO TIME-BASED PRICING 9 (2010), https://perma.cc/
8P7L-M6L5. These concerns become more important as dynamic pricing becomes more
prevalent. N.C. CLEAN ENERGY TECH. CTR., supra note 96, at 35–39 tbl.4 (describing R
numerous states’ dynamic pricing initiatives).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLE\43-2\HLE202.txt unknown Seq: 24  3-JUL-19 9:37
330 Harvard Environmental Law Review [Vol. 43
the ‘average’ residential customer.”100 More recently, as part of its major docket
in “Reforming the Energy Vision,” New York’s Public Service Commission
created an entire sub-docket devoted to impacts on low-income consumers.101
These developments provide hints of how the legal requirement of “just rates”
might provide opportunities for PUCs to scrutinize grid modernization ex-
penditures and new rate designs more closely. And they suggest that the ques-
tion of who pays is likely to increase in importance as PUCs undertake the
ambitious reform agendas necessary to build a grid capable of managing emerg-
ing technologies and regulatory imperatives.102
IV. WHO BENEFITS? SPREADING THE GAINS OF THE
CLEAN ENERGY ECONOMY
In the previous section, we explored the ways in which certain clean energy
policies might impose unfair costs on less affluent consumers (although as we
explained, the evidence to date is mixed). In this section, we turn to the flip side
of clean energy’s distributive consequences, examining whether all Americans
share equally in the benefits of investments in clean energy. Environmental
groups, energy firms, and state policymakers celebrate clean energy policies for
their ability to create new economic sectors; hundreds of thousands of stable,
domestic jobs; empowered consumers; and healthier communities.103 Such
100. In re Baltimore Gas & Elec., 101 Md. P.S.C. 149 (June 21, 2010) (denying utility’s request
for Authorization to Deploy a Smart Grid Initiative and to Establish a Surcharge for the
Recovery of Cost). Maryland later approved the program with some modifications. See MD.
PUB. SERV. COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2017, at 21, https://perma.cc/9VLF-RXLV.
101. See Proceeding on Motion of the Commission to Examine Programs to Address Energy Af-
fordability for Low Income Utility Customers, Case No. 14-M-0565, N.Y. ST. DEP’T PUB.
SERV., https://perma.cc/SFR8-YX2G.
102. The same dynamic is at work in questions of how to fund electric vehicle infrastructure.
Several states are contemplating allowing their utilities to build, own, and operate electric
vehicle charging stations, passing the costs on to ratepayers. See Alexandra B. Klass, Public
Utilities and Transportation Electrification, 104 IOWA L. REV. 545, 549–50 (2019). Some
have raised justice-based challenges to this ratepayer funding, arguing that wealthy custom-
ers who can afford to buy pricier electric vehicles will disproportionately benefit from such
schemes. See David Ferris, Utility Regulators: No Easy Road to Supporting EVs,
ENERGYWIRE (June 21, 2018), https://perma.cc/FB9T-2B24. California has responded by
requiring that a certain percentage of charging stations be built within low-income commu-
nities. See Transportation Electrification Activities Pursuant to SB 350, CAL. PUB. UTILS.
COMM’N, Summary Table, https://perma.cc/3SSY-6EML (documenting utility commit-
ments to include a certain percentage of charging stations in low-income communities).
103. For some of the many examples of this, see MARTIN HEINRICH, U.S. CONG., JOINT ECON.
COMM., CLEAN ENERGY: IT’S WHERE THE JOBS ARE (2017); JAY INSLEE, POLICY BRIEF,
SECURING WASHINGTON’S CLEAN ENERGY FUTURE (2018); Benefits of Renewable Energy
Use, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, https://perma.cc/US46-LKUN (last revised Dec.
20, 2017); Elizabeth Noll & Derek Murrow, State of Clean Energy Is Strong, NRDC EX-
PERT BLOG (Jan. 31, 2018), https://perma.cc/F96Q-KRHU.
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promises are being realized: Advances in clean energy technologies and data
management have spurred the growth of firms specializing in new technologies
like demand response, data optimization, and analytics for electricity usage.104
And the rapid year-over-year growth in industries such as wind and solar en-
ergy, that until very recently were just getting off the ground, is impressive.
This new economy offers benefits at various levels. Individuals can reduce
their carbon footprints while saving money on their utility bills and improving
the reliability of their electricity service. Those who obtain clean energy jobs
have the economic security that accompanies stable employment. For commu-
nities, the production, operation and maintenance of distributed energy facili-
ties or community energy projects creates direct jobs and other economic
benefits.105 When clean energy facilities are built on underutilized properties—
“brownfields”—and become “brightfields,” property values increase.106 All of
these benefits might be especially welcome in localities fearing the devastating
economic effects of fossil fuel plant shutdowns.107
These potential economic benefits form a unique aspect of a clean energy
justice agenda. Although environmental justice advocacy has led to measurable
economic benefits (such as those resulting from lessened health risks), it never
grappled as distinctly with the distribution of the benefits of entire new eco-
nomic sectors. How these economic gains are distributed is likely to be a critical
component of the perceived fairness of the clean energy transition.
The analytics, however, are challenging. Clean energy’s tangible benefits
can be divided into two basic categories: direct (immediate impacts such as
104. See Eisen, Demand Response’s Three Generations, supra note 5, at 419–21; GTM Editors, Grid R
Edge 20: The Top Companies Disrupting the US Electric Market, GRID EDGE (Apr. 23, 2015),
https://perma.cc/HE8P-AAVD (listing data analytics firms and others with new business
models).
105. See, e.g., EPA, ASSESSING THE MULTIPLE BENEFITS OF CLEAN ENERGY: A RESOURCE
FOR STATES 5–11 (2011), https://perma.cc/GF9N-Q6QA; NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY
LAB., COMMUNITY SHARED SOLAR POLICY AND REGULATORY CONSIDERATIONS 1
(2014), https://perma.cc/8CVY-6GKQ (“Shared solar projects allow customers that do not
have sufficient solar resource, that rent their homes, or that are otherwise unable or unwilling
to install solar on their residences, to buy or lease a portion of a shared solar system.”).
106. See Silvio Marcacci, Solar Brightfields: Gigawatts Of Clean Energy Potential On America’s
Landfills And Brownfields, FORBES (Aug. 10, 2017), https://perma.cc/F5GK-DACN; Joel B.
Eisen, Finality in Brownfields Remediation and Reuse, 41 SW. L. REV. 773, 778, 785–86
(2012).
107. See Diane Cardwell, What’s Up in Coal Country: Alternative-Energy Jobs, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
30, 2017), https://perma.cc/A9B8-9NDH (discussing communities in Wyoming and West
Virginia); KATHARINE MCCORMICK, NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL, BRIDGING THE CLEAN
ENERGY DIVIDE: AFFORDABLE CLEAN ENERGY SOLUTIONS FOR TODAY AND TO-
MORROW 16 (2015), https://perma.cc/MRQ4-DDDB (“[W]ind farms have revitalized rural
areas that have seen stagnant or declining populations and income since 1970.”); Erin
Ailworth, Wind Power Wins Converts In Rural U.S., WALL STREET J., (Sept. 6, 2017),
https://perma.cc/492L-UF8Z (discussing the impact of a wind farm on the economy of
Benton County, Indiana).
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lower electricity bills or the reduction in a vehicle’s price due to a tax incentive)
and indirect (induced impacts such as increased income and purchasing
power).108 The causal connection of many clean energy policies to both direct
and indirect benefits is a matter that requires considerable speculation. For ex-
ample, if a state establishes an incentive for purchase of electric vehicles, who
benefits and how? Obviously the direct purchaser receives the primary eco-
nomic benefit, but the residents of the neighborhoods that drivers frequent en-
joy better air quality; the state moves incrementally closer to establishing an
economically viable electric vehicle infrastructure; and the world benefits even
more incrementally from fewer tons of greenhouse gas emissions. Similarly, if a
wholesale market operator establishes a structure that facilitates distributed en-
ergy resource aggregation and bidding into wholesale energy and capacity mar-
kets, who benefits? The answers likely include solar panel owners, small
businesses, retail electricity suppliers, and end-use consumers, all to varying de-
grees depending on how the policy is structured. For these reasons, analysis of
these policies’ distributional consequences is often guesswork. Even for those
benefits that are quantifiable, there has been little systematic analysis, and even
less attention to distributional consequences.
Nevertheless, there are several important conversations—and some at-
tempts at policy innovations—already underway regarding the distribution of
clean energy’s benefits. In this Part, we highlight several of the most promi-
nent. We begin with a discussion of “green jobs,” given the central role they
have played in clean energy advocacy. We then turn to emerging discussions of
how to broaden participation in clean energy incentive programs, looking at the
evidence regarding net metering, clean energy tax credits, and electric vehicle
rebates.
A. The Distribution of “Green Jobs”
To economists, jobs are a cost, not a benefit: They view it as advantageous
to reduce labor costs per unit of output, not increase them by adding more
jobs.109 But to a community, jobs are an enormous benefit of welcoming a new
industry. For this reason, we treat domestic job creation as a positive compo-
nent of the clean energy transition. By one account, solar PV installers are the
fastest growing job category in the nation.110 Given the projections of future
solar and wind deployment outlined in Part I, renewable energy job growth is
likely to persist, although it is impossible to know with precision what job sec-
tors or positions will dominate in the future. Nevertheless, current figures pro-
vide at least a snapshot of the distribution of clean energy jobs. Developing this
108. EPA, supra note 105, at 134–38. R
109. See, e.g., Tim Worstall, Jobs Are a Cost Not a Benefit, FORBES (Nov. 23, 2011), https://perma
.cc/J4U5-M2C8.
110. Jordan Yadoo, These Are the Fastest Growing Jobs in the U.S., BLOOMBERG BUS. (Oct. 24,
2017), https://perma.cc/3UYQ-NPZ9.
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snapshot is critical, as any troubling distributional patterns might more success-
fully be addressed in the near term, before industry trends become cemented
and more difficult to reverse.
1. Threshold Data Issues
Until recently, virtually no data had been collected on the socioeconomic
distribution of clean energy jobs. Indeed, there has not even been a reliable
single measure of green energy jobs,111 unlike the situation for fossil fuel indus-
tries.112 Data was collected by individual industry trade associations (which re-
ported employment only in their industries) and public interest groups. Any
reported figures had to be taken with a grain of salt, as each dataset was com-
piled uniquely.113
Today, the data is somewhat improved, but there are still critical gaps.
Most notably, there remains no consistently accepted description of a “clean
energy job.”114 We take as our definition all positions associated with the pro-
duction of low- or zero-carbon energy or with energy conservation (including
energy efficiency, demand response, and similar sectors).115 One useful baseline
is the employment data in the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (“BLS”) Quar-
terly Census of Employment and Wages (“QCEW”), which many current
measures of green jobs draw from.116 We also rely on the 2017 Department of
Energy “U.S. Energy and Employment Report” (“USEER”),117 which aimed to
111. A 2015 assessment bemoans the piecemeal nature of the data, which relied predominantly
on inadequate industry group statistics. See Silvio Marcacci, 1.2 Million US Green Jobs Re-
ported in Q1. Here’s Why That’s a Problem, CLEANTECHNICA (June 5, 2015), https://perma
.cc/4TSA-4BWT.
112. BLS tracks jobs in oil, natural gas, and coal, which makes it much easier for proponents of
fossil fuels to credibly cite potential job losses from clean energy policies. Id.; see also About
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://perma.cc/H5TW-XWVA.
113. Daniel Lopez, Fact Sheet—Jobs in Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency, ENVTL. & EN-
ERGY STUDY INST. (Feb. 2017), https://perma.cc/9474-WCUC (noting discrepancies).
114. The U.S. Energy and Employment Report, discussed above, does not define “clean energy
job.” U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, U.S. ENERGY AND EMPLOYMENT REPORT 12 (2017),
https://perma.cc/C99L-F4YJ.
115. The BLS’ “Green Jobs Initiative” tracked green jobs data between 2010 and 2013 and used a
similar definition. Measuring Green Jobs, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://perma.cc/D6GW-
EXNA (“Green jobs are either: A. Jobs in businesses that produce goods or provide services
that benefit the environment or conserve natural resources. B. Jobs in which workers’ duties
involve making their establishment’s production processes more environmentally friendly or
use fewer natural resources.”).
116. Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://perma.cc/JL6T-
RG5J (measuring green jobs through an “output approach” focused on firms producing
green goods, and a “process approach” focused on firms that use environmentally friendly
production processes and practices).
117. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 114. In 2018, the Department of Energy chose not to R
publish this report, leaving it to a private sector organization to pick up the slack. Robert
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close “major gaps in existing energy employment data.”118 Still, USEER cover-
age likely undercounts green energy jobs, as it omits indirect or induced jobs
such as positions at a steel company created when the company received an
order to make wind turbines.119
We also must acknowledge the vigorous debate underway about the per-
manence and pervasiveness of employment impacts in clean energy. For every
story about a locality in recovery due to wind and solar farm development or
celebration of opportunities to assist displaced miners in Appalachia,120 there is
a critique that wind and solar do not generate enough long-term jobs to offset
fossil-fuel job losses.121 There are other uncertainties about the reported data.
Clean energy jobs are tracked and collapsed into several ill-fitting traditional
job categories, making it difficult to separate out, for example, solar installers
from electrical contractors more generally.122 Finally, many clean energy jobs are
in small firms that do not report job data, which skews the picture still further.
Still, these data with their attendant uncertainties present the fullest pic-
ture possible of clean energy employment trends. And while there are numerous
line drawing problems, some have recently been addressed,123 which increases
confidence in the available data.
2. Clean Energy Employment Demographics
Available data show that the participation rate of women and people of
color in clean energy jobs lags well behind that of the workforce in general and
representation in the general population. Indeed, the renewable energy industry
is less diverse even than the electric utility industry as a whole, which itself is
Walton, The Energy Sector Is Driving Job Growth, But Not Where You Think, UTILITY DIVE
(June 7, 2018), https://perma.cc/868L-W5JP.
118. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 114, at 7. R
119. Indirect employment includes jobs created via supply or contracting services. Induced jobs
are a result of the economic impact of direct and indirect employees spending their earnings.
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 114, at 11 n.4. The USEER only includes direct manu- R
facturing jobs associated with production of ENERGY STAR certified energy efficiency
products, and therefore would not include the indirect employment generated at, e.g., the
steel firm. Id. at 14–15.
120. Cardwell, supra note 107. R
121. See, e.g., ROBERT MICHAELS & ROBERT P. MURPHY, INST. FOR ECON. RES., GREEN
JOBS: FACT OR FICTION? (Jan. 2009), https://perma.cc/ZD2B-PK6W.
122. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 114, at 10. R
123. As one example, an electrician may string wires on a clean energy project one day, and on a
house the next. The USEER classifies this as a “green job” if a worker spends a majority of
their time on green energy. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 114, at 14 n.7. R
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not diverse.124 Representation in positions requiring professional training, such
as engineering, lags as well.125
The USEER found that 1.9 million workers were directly employed in the
“Electric Power Generation and Fuels” sector in 2017.126 This includes all elec-
tric generating technologies (fossil fuels, nuclear, or renewable energy technolo-
gies), and firms engaged in facility construction, turbine and other generation
equipment manufacturing, and wholesale parts distribution.127 Almost 800,000
of these jobs were in renewables, nuclear, and advanced or low emission natural
gas positions, with wind and solar making up roughly half of that figure.128
Most of the 13% year-over-year increase in jobs is attributable to clean energy
growth, specifically construction employees installing and building new facili-
ties.129 Solar and wind employment increased by 25% and 32% in 2016, respec-
tively.130 Finally, in December 2016, there were 2.2 million energy efficiency-
124. THE SOLAR FOUND., NATIONAL SOLAR JOBS CENSUS 2016, at 15 (2017) [hereinafter SO-
LAR JOBS CENSUS 2016], https://perma.cc/4RT6-4Y9U (“The percent of women and mi-
norities [in the solar industry] are within about 1 to 2% of that of the electric power
generation industry.”). Women make up only 22% of jobs in the electric utility industry,
compared to 47% participation in the overall workforce. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, QUAD-
RENNIAL ENERGY REVIEW: TRANSFORMING THE NATION’S ELECTRICITY SECTOR: THE
SECOND INSTALLMENT OF THE QER 5-9 (2017), https://perma.cc/4PC5-XPUG.
125. In drawing these conclusions, we rely upon the USEER, see U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra
note 114, existing BLS QCEW jobs datasets, see Quarterly Census, supra note 116, and three R
individual sector reports: the Solar Foundation’s National Solar Jobs Census; the American
Wind Energy Association’s Market Report; and the report by E4TheFuture titled “Energy
Efficiency Jobs in America.” See SOLAR JOBS CENSUS 2016, supra note 124; AM. WIND R
ENERGY ASS’N, 2016 U.S. WIND INDUSTRY MARKET REPORTS (2016), https://perma.cc/
K8SM-2YEF [hereinafter AWEA 2016 REPORT]; E4THEFUTURE, ENVTL. ENTREPRE-
NEURS & BW RES. PARTNERSHIP, ENERGY EFFICIENCY JOBS IN AMERICA (2016), https://
perma.cc/84ZY-AADH. In addition, the International Renewable Energy Agency reports
on summary figures and draws useful comparisons with workforce participation by women
and people of color in other countries. INT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY AGENCY, RENEWABLE
ENERGY AND JOBS ANNUAL REVIEW 2017 (2017), https://perma.cc/MM49-TFAZ.
126. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 114, at 8. R
127. Id. at 20. The report also evaluates jobs in “Transmission, Distribution and Storage” and
“Energy Efficiency.” The first of these is difficult to analyze, as it includes a large number of
workers at traditional utilities who have nothing to do with clean energy, and 100,000 jobs in
energy storage and smart grid. As the overall conclusions with respect to demographics are
basically the same as in the generation sector, we have not analyzed this category separately.
128. Just under 380,000 individuals work, in whole or in part, for solar firms, with more than
260,000 of those employees spending the majority of their time on solar. U.S. wind farms
employ over 100,000 workers. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 114, at 8; see also AWEA R
2016 REPORT, supra note 125, at 100; ENVTL. DEF. FUND, NOW HIRING: THE GROWTH R
OF AMERICA’S CLEAN ENERGY & SUSTAINABILITY JOBS 4 (2017), https://perma.cc/
H7UX-K7MK (stating that there are 769,000 jobs in the renewable energy sector).
129. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 114, at 22. R
130. Id. at 8.
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related jobs in the United States,131 with 880,000 of these in firms whose prin-
cipal function is energy efficiency.132
The numbers presented above suggest a total of around 1.3 million wind,
solar, and energy efficiency jobs in the United States at most recent count. This
dwarfs the 160,000 coal jobs in the United States,133 and it is likely that clean
energy has added several hundred thousand more jobs since these data were
collected. But the particular question of interest to us is who holds these jobs—
and whether clean energy industries make efforts at workforce diversity that
could spread clean energy’s benefits more widely.
The available data help illuminate the demographics of clean energy em-
ployment writ large, but do not allow for the kind of granular analysis that
would prove most helpful. Although the USEER classifies workers into sub-
sectors,134 it does not include demographic information about who is employed
in each subsector.135 Only the solar report collects subsector demographic
data,136 which it began to do in 2013.137
Even with these limited data, one can discern that the clean energy sector
is considerably less diverse than the economy as a whole, across both gender
and race. The USEER notes:
Women are a smaller portion of the workforce in these sectors, rang-
ing from 22 to 34 percent, compared to the overall economy, where
women make up 47 percent of the workforce. The percentage of eth-
nic and racial minorities is slightly lower than the national average for
Hispanic or Latino workers (14 percent versus 16 percent) and Black
or African American workers (eight percent versus 12 percent).138
131. Id.
132. E4THEFUTURE ET AL., supra note 125, at 19. R
133. Nadja Popovich, Today’s Energy Jobs Are in Solar, Not Coal, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2017),
https://perma.cc/9K5M-R345.
134. “The largest proportion of workers in Electric Power Generation in the USEER are classi-
fied as installation or repair positions (27%), followed by administrative positions (24%), and
management/professional positions (20%).” U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 114, at 32. R
135. Similarly, the E4 report only lists overall demographic trends in the sector. See
E4THEFUTURE ET AL., supra note 125 at 3–5. R
136. The American Wind Energy Association does not collect or report this data. E-mail from
Celeste Wanner, Res. Analyst, Am. Wind Energy Ass’n to Joel B. Eisen, Austin Owen Res.
Fellow, Univ. Richmond Sch. of Law (June 19, 2017, 10:17 EST) (on file with author).
Accordingly, the only data on the wind industry is contained in the USEER, which notes
that the wind subsector “has a nearly identical demographic distribution as the solar sector.”
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 114, at 39. R
137. In 2012 and preceding years, the Solar Jobs Census lacked this breakdown. Compare THE
SOLAR FOUND., NATIONAL SOLAR JOBS CENSUS 2012 (Nov. 2012), https://perma.cc/
8FXE-VWVY (no breakdown in 2012 census), with SOLAR JOBS CENSUS 2016, supra note
124, at 16 (demographic data provided). R
138. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 114, at 9. R
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Until recently, the picture was even less favorable. The 2013 solar census—the
first that collected demographic data—noted that women made up just 18.7%
of the solar workforce.139 Participation by people of color is still well below
overall numbers for participation in the workforce.140
In two solar industry subsectors that require specialized skills—installation
and project development141—women are more severely underrepresented, and
the picture with respect to people of color is mixed at best. Women made up
25.2% of the solar installation subsector in 2016, compared to 46.8% of the
overall workforce. African-Americans held 7.1% of installation jobs, compared
to 11.7% of the overall workforce.142 Only Latinos were equally represented in
solar installation jobs and the general workforce.143
In project development, which includes utilities and companies that work
on utility-scale solar projects, the picture is comparable. Project developers rely
on employees with a wider range of higher paid administrative and professional
skills, including civil engineers, land surveyors, and power plant operators. Nev-
ertheless, participation in this subsector by women and people of color was no
better than in the installation subsector.144
3. Suggestions for Research and Policy
Scholars and journalists are just beginning to take note of the inequitable
distribution of clean energy jobs.145 In their article titled “Toward A Gender
Diverse Workforce in the Renewable Energy Transition,” Professor Jennie Ste-
phens and co-author Rebecca Pearl-Martinez confirm the analysis above that
women are underrepresented in skilled positions in renewable energy firms.146
But considerably more work remains to be done to understand these disparities
and potential remedies for them.
139. THE SOLAR FOUND., NATIONAL SOLAR JOBS CENSUS 2013 (Jan. 2014) [hereinafter SO-
LAR JOBS CENSUS 2013], https://perma.cc/P33E-R63E.
140. Latino/Hispanic solar workers increased from 15.6% of the solar workforce in 2013 to 17.2%
in 2016. African-American workers increased from 5.9% to 6.6%. SOLAR JOBS CENSUS
2016, supra note 124, at 14. R
141. See SOLAR JOBS CENSUS 2013, supra note 139 (dividing solar jobs into the categories of R
Installation, Sales and Distribution, Manufacturing, Project Development, and Other); ac-
cord JAMES HAMILTON, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, CAREERS IN SOLAR POWER
(2011), https://perma.cc/3SLY-PHKA.
142. SOLAR JOBS CENSUS 2016, supra note 124, at 22 tbl.9. R
143. Id.
144. See id.
145. See, e.g., Rebecca Pearl-Martinez & Jennie C. Stephens, Toward a Gender Diverse Workforce
in the Renewable Energy Transition, 12 SUSTAINABILITY 8 (2016); Kate Rosow Chrisman,
Women Apply Here: The Solar Industry Is Trying To Fix Its Gender Issue, CNBC (Dec. 4,
2014), https://perma.cc/RZJ7-WH6U.
146. Pearl-Martinez & Stephens, supra note 145, at 4. R
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Better data will be critical in these efforts. At the very least, the USEER or
comparable private-sector analyses147 should be expanded to provide more gran-
ular presentations of data from industry subsectors. Others have called for a
more widespread effort “to capture and track the gender employment trends
and statistics for women globally [in solar].”148 Similar efforts should be ex-
pended in collecting more systematic, robust data for clean energy employment
by race and class. More work should also be done to understand how the gen-
der dynamics in clean energy employment relate to disparities in race and
income.149
In addition, no employment report discusses how to address the disparities
that research is uncovering, causing a dearth of informed strategies as to how to
improve the participation of women and people of color in clean energy jobs.
Even though individual industries are quick to tout their overall employment
statistics, their analyses have been slow to discuss efforts to diversify their
workforces. As an example, none of the four Solar Jobs Census proposals for
solar job growth through 2017 addressed increasing participation by women
and people of color in solar jobs, and the only mention of diversity in the
workforce was in a recommendation about training veterans for solar jobs.150
The first Solar Industry Diversity Study, which includes recommendations to
address racial and gender diversity, was issued in 2017.151 Outside pressure on
these companies also remains scant: Only a handful of organizations target the
challenges of increasing the participation of women and people of color in clean
energy industries, principally through networking, outreach, and raising aware-
ness of the underlying issues.152
The data we do have suggest that the overall trend of underrepresentation
of women and people of color in clean energy is comparable to historical under-
representation in the construction, engineering, and project development sec-
tors of the economy. As such, addressing the inequities may require policy
prescriptions that go beyond clean energy, such as programs and incentives in-
creasing the participation of women and people of color in STEM profes-
sions.153 To date, however, this broader discussion has not been meaningfully
147. See supra note 117 and accompanying text (noting that the 2018 report was done by a private R
sector group).
148. About WISE, WOMEN IN SOLAR ENERGY (“WISE”), https://perma.cc/G72G-MJ2W.
149. See Sonali Jain-Chandra, Why Gender and Income Inequality Are Linked, WORLD ECON. F.
(Oct. 27, 2015), https://perma.cc/X5EX-MNUX (finding “that gender inequality is strongly
associated with income inequality across time and countries of all income groups”).
150. SOLAR JOBS CENSUS 2016, supra note 124, at 47–48. R
151. THE SOLAR FOUND., 2017 U.S. SOLAR INDUSTRY DIVERSITY STUDY (2017), https://per
ma.cc/5JJ4-NL54.
152. WOMEN OF RENEWABLE INDUSTRIES AND SUSTAINABLE ENERGY (“WRISE”), https://
perma.cc/6T5C-22JG.
153. Pearl-Martinez & Stephens, supra note 145, at 4. R
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linked to clean energy employment, and the issues require considerably more
attention. Particularly given the rhetoric regarding the community development
potential of clean energy, the industry has a responsibility to do more to deliver
on its promises.
B. Reaping the Benefits of New Technologies
In Part II of this article, we explored how to ensure that the costs of the
grid do not fall disproportionately on those who do not adopt new technolo-
gies. But guarding against overpayment by non-participants does not fully ad-
dress the challenges of the emerging haves-versus-have-nots divide in clean
energy. Less affluent customers should also have access to the suite of technolo-
gies that affluent consumers use to lower their bills.154 To put it more colloqui-
ally, there is a need to ensure that solar panels are not “the next granite
countertop,”155 available only to those who can afford them. The same can be
said about access to a host of other benefits, most prominently clean energy tax
credits and electric vehicle rebates. Evidence to date shows that the distribution
of benefits from these clean energy policies diverges substantially by class.156
And while states and localities are attempting to broaden participation, they
have not always addressed this fundamental class divide.
Net Metering: The most comprehensive and up-to-date study of net me-
tering participation in the United States finds that participation varies substan-
tially by class. Across the thirteen states studied, the authors found that rooftop
PV adopters have a median income that is fifty-four percent higher than the
overall median household income.157 That said, this gap appears to be closing as
more owner-occupied homes install solar panels,158 due in part to falling panel
costs and the rise of third-party leasing arrangements, and in part to concerted
state efforts to expand access.159
State programs to expand rooftop solar adoption take several shapes—
from mandatory set-asides of a certain percentage of state funding for low-
154. See Welton, Clean Electrification, supra note 63, at 576 (making this case). R
155. Justin Doom, Solar Panel Is Next Granite Countertop for Homebuilders, BLOOMBERG (Sept.
11, 2013), https://perma.cc/2HJ5-S6D8.
156. Data that disaggregate participation by race are considerably more sparse. That said, race and
class are correlated in unfortunate ways in the United States. See JESSICA L. SEMEGA,
KAYLA R. FONTENOT & MELISSA A. KOLLAR, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME AND POV-
ERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2016, at 5 fig.1 (2017), https://perma.cc/QZK5-AT6Q
(showing a persistent trend in lower incomes for Black and Latino families than for White or
Asian families in the United States).
157. See GALEN BARBOSE ET AL., LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY
SOLAR ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES OFFICE, INCOME TRENDS OF RESIDENTIAL PV ADOPT-
ERS: AN ANALYSIS OF HOUSEHOLD-LEVEL INCOME ESTIMATES 12 (2018).
158. Id. at 15.
159. Id. at 18.
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income households,160 to experiments in allowing utility ownership of rooftop
solar only in low- and middle-income homes,161 to higher payments to low-
income solar adopters.162 It is too early to evaluate the efficacy of these pro-
grams, but their proliferation confirms a basic point at the heart of our article:
States are beginning to recognize and act upon some of the clean energy justice
concerns we identify here, in ways that suggest the tractability of these concerns
within the frameworks of energy law.163
Nevertheless, programs that enable more low-income households to install
solar panels still exclude the large percentage of the population who are not
homeowners.164 In light of this continued disparity, fifteen states have now
adopted “virtual net metering” and “community solar” programs to broaden the
ability of all residents to earn a “cut” of the solar revolution.165 In these pro-
grams, utilities or other third-party providers develop larger solar arrays, and
community members can purchase a “share” of the output of the project, which
then gets credited against their bill in a fashion similar to net metering.166 In
theory, these programs might reduce class disparities in solar ownership because
they eliminate the need for a suitable roof and as much upfront capital. But in
practice, low-income consumers may not be able to take advantage of such pro-
grams, due to credit requirements and prohibitive subscription fees.167 More
160. See, e.g., GoSolar California, Single Family Affordable Solar Housing (SASH), CAL. ENERGY
COMM’N (2019), https://perma.cc/M753-23LQ.
161. See Proceeding on Motion of the Commission in Regard to Reforming the Energy Vision,
319 P.U.R.4th 45–46 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Feb. 26, 2015) (order).
162. For example, Mississippi offered an “additional 2 cents per kWh credit” for the first 1,000
low-income rooftop solar installers. MISS. ATTY. GEN., A CONSUMER’S GUIDE TO SOLAR
POWER AND NET METERING IN MISSISSIPPI 3, https://perma.cc/97DN-GDPE. Massa-
chusetts similarly plans to offer a new incentive program that rewards extra renewable energy
credits to low-income, small solar projects. See Massachusetts, GRID ALTERNATIVES, VOTE
SOLAR & CTR. FOR SOC. INCLUSION, LOW-INCOME SOLAR POLICY GUIDE, https://per
ma.cc/6A9U-NQZ9.
163. See infra Part VI.
164. Americans homeowners make up 64.2% of the population, see Press Release, U.S. Census
Bureau, Quarterly Residential Vacancies and Homeownership, First Quarter 2019 tbl.1
(Apr. 25, 2019), https://perma.cc/Q5RH-7W93, but only 46.8% of “all minorities” own
their home, see Carmel Ford, Homeownership by Race and Ethnicity, EYE ON HOUSING (Dec.
15, 2017), https://perma.cc/LGR8-DUWF. Households with greater than the U.S. median
income have a home ownership rate of 78%, whereas households below the median income
have an ownership rate of only 50.5%. U.S. Census Bureau, supra, at tbl.8.
165. Gabriel Chan et al., Design Choices and Equity Implications of Community Shared Solar, 30
ELECTRICITY J. 37, 37 (2017).
166. See id.
167. See id. at 39; see also Baker, supra note 88, at 12; Julian Spector, How to Fix Solar Power’s
Inequality Problem, CITYLAB (Mar. 11, 2016), https://perma.cc/STY8-BG9F (“[V]ery few
community renewables programs actively include [low-income] residents.”).
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work needs to be done to track community solar participation by race and class,
and to understand what barriers remain for wider participation.168
Clean Energy Tax Credits: A second way in which the ability to benefit
from clean energy may be segregated by race and class comes from the wide-
spread use of tax credits to promote clean energy’s adoption. In a 2016 study,
Severin Borenstein and Lucas Davis focused on the equity implications of fed-
eral clean energy tax credits. Of the $18 billion in federal clean energy tax cred-
its disbursed since 2006, they found that “the bottom three income quintiles
have received about 10% of all credits, while the top quintile has received about
60%.”169 Consequently, they conclude, tax credits—for all of their political ap-
peal—are a poor choice of instrument if one is concerned about the equity
implications of promoting clean energy.170 Whether tax credits could be de-
signed to be more equitable—or should instead be avoided—is a question wor-
thy of considerably more discussion, now that these findings are in.171
Electric Vehicles: Nowhere is the tax credit disparity more glaring than
when it comes to electric vehicles: Borenstein and Davis report that federal
electric vehicle credit programs are the most inequitable of all, with the top 20%
of earners receiving 90% of all related credits since 2006.172 Consequently, there
have been a few recent moves to target subsidy programs for electric vehicles
specifically to lower-income consumers. For example, California’s “Clean Vehi-
cle Rebate Project” ties rebate amounts to the purchaser’s income and precludes
those with incomes over $150,000 from participation.173 In a different vein,
other California energy providers issue rebates for used as well as new electric
vehicles, to make these vehicles more accessible to a broader range of
residents.174
* * *
168. Chan et al., supra note 165, at 40 (making a similar call for more research). R
169. Severin Borenstein & Lucas W. Davis, The Distributional Effects of US Clean Energy Tax
Credits, in TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 191 (Jeffrey R. Brown ed., 2016).
170. Id. at 192.
171. See Lynsey Gaudioso, A Billion Grains of Truth: Distributional Impacts of Household-Level
Climate Change Tax Subsidies in the United States, 18 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 667, 698–705 (2017)
(suggesting ways these tax credit programs could be reformed rather than abandoned).
172. Borenstein & Davis, supra note 169, at 191; see also RYAN C. BOSWORTH & GRANT PATTY, R
THE CURRENT STATE OF ELECTRIC VEHICLE SUBSIDIES: ECONOMIC, ENVIRONMENTAL,
AND DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACTS 14 (2017) (arguing that these effects are compounded by
the fact that “the environmental benefits of electric vehicles are also mostly captured by those
with higher than average incomes”).
173. See Income Eligibility, CAL. CLEAN VEHICLE REBATE PROJECT, https://perma.cc/Q78T-
4X33.
174. See Brandon Brooks, Charge Up Crenshaw: LADWP Launches New Rebate Program for Used
Electric Vehicles, L.A. SENTINEL (Apr. 19, 2018), https://perma.cc/S9RN-6JHK.
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We close this section by noting the controversy that surrounds decisions to
expand the benefits of clean energy incentive programs in the ways discussed
here. Decisions to design around distributional impacts often involve challeng-
ing tradeoffs between program efficacy and program fairness—at least, if you
assume that program funding is fixed.175 If a program has $100,000 to spur
uptake of electric vehicles, it could get 100 such vehicles on the road if it offered
rebates of $1000 to all comers. If the program administrators instead award
$2000 to lower-income purchasers, then they may get as few as 50 vehicles on
the road with the same amount of funding—thus reducing the program’s effi-
cacy.176 These criticisms are numerically accurate, but they miss a broader point:
one can view the second hypothetical program above as less effective only if the
only goal of the program is to deploy electric vehicles. If, instead, it is politically
determined (for moral or instrumental reasons) that the program should also
have an aim of equalizing the benefits of clean energy, then its effectiveness can
only be judged by whether it accomplishes these dual aims.177
Still, a broader point obtains: it may be that there are better ways of broad-
ening access to clean energy than through the types of consumer-centered poli-
cies detailed here. We return to this point in Part V, where we discuss lessons
to be gleaned from assembling the clean energy justice agenda.
V. PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
Thus far, this Article has focused on the distribution of the substantive
benefits and burdens of clean energy. This Part focuses on the procedures
through which these concerns can be raised, vetted, and addressed. Here again,
clean energy justice has an antecedent in the environmental justice movement,
whose participants describe a growing understanding of the importance of en-
suring procedural justice as a precursor to advancing substantive concerns.178 To
175. This assumption may well not be a fair one. Designing a more just program might create
greater political buy-in, such that more funding could be secured.
176. See David M. Schizer, Energy Subsidies: Worthy Goals, Competing Priorities, and Flawed Insti-
tutional Design, 70 TAX L. REV. 243, 293–94 (creating a similar example and arguing that
“the social benefit is comparable, whether the subsidy is claimed by someone with a high or
low income”). But see Gaudioso, supra note 171, at 678 (arguing that targeting lower-income R
consumers may be more cost-effective if higher-income consumers would choose to invest
regardless of the subsidy).
177. For example, as one California report notes, programs focused on expanding access to clean
energy can “result in substantially larger multipliers for economic development.” CAL. EN-
ERGY COMM’N, CEC-300-2016-009, LOW-INCOME BARRIERS STUDY, PART A: OVER-
COMING BARRIERS TO ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLES FOR LOW-INCOME
CUSTOMERS AND SMALL BUSINESS CONTRACTING OPPORTUNITIES IN DISADVANTAGED
COMMUNITIES 1 (2016).
178. See Sheila Foster, Race(ial) Matters: The Quest for Environmental Justice, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q.
721, 746–49 (1993); Kaswan, supra note 10, at 251. R
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create a more just energy transition, clean energy justice advocates will similarly
have to attend to procedural conditions and constraints.
We use the phrase “procedural justice” in a classic sense: “the fairness of
the process by which goods are allocated and decisions made,” with a particular
focus on “the opportunity for all interested parties to participate in the decision
process.”179 Our procedural justice analysis therefore focuses on the institutions
and decisionmaking processes that govern clean energy.180
In this Part, we present the key institutional structures and evidence to
date regarding the state of procedural justice in the field. We find that there are
acute challenges to participation in energy governance, for two reasons. First,
the legal frameworks and proceedings in which clean energy justice concerns
arise are particularly technical and adjudicative in nature. Second, energy pro-
ceedings are dominated by sophisticated regulated utilities or merchant energy
companies with longstanding regulatory relationships and substantial financial
interests that cut against clean energy justice concerns.
The data we present below suggest the persistence of century-old chal-
lenges in designing regulated industries laws in ways that do not converge into a
“grand compromise” of regulators and regulated parties.181 Clean energy pro-
ceedings contend with outsized influence of repeat player utilities, and the few
community groups that invest the time to participate often find their input
marginalized by the dominance of technical issues.
A. Energy Law Fora as Challenging Venues
Clean energy lawmaking and policymaking occur in a few predominant
venues: state legislatures, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC),
the regional grid operators that FERC oversees, and state PUCs.182
179. Susan Clayton, Models of Justice in the Environmental Debate, 56 J. SOC. ISSUES 459, 461
(2000); see also William A. Shutkin, The Concept of Environmental Justice and a Reconception
of Democracy, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 579, 585 (1995); Kaswan, supra note 10, at 233. R
180. We do not consider here the broader choice presented in climate change policy between
markets and regulators as the key drivers of decarbonization decisionmaking. On this
broader question, see, e.g., Ann E. Carlson, Designing Effective Climate Policy: Cap-and-
Trade and Complementary Policies, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 207, 210 (2012); Alice Kaswan,
Energy, Governance, and Market Mechanisms, 72 U. MIAMI L. REV. 476, 509 (2018);
Welton, Social Project, supra note 6, at 1069. R
181. See RICHARD HIRSH, POWER LOSS: THE ORIGINS OF DEREGULATION AND RESTRUC-
TURING IN THE AMERICAN ELECTRIC UTILITY SYSTEM 9 (1999) (describing the twentieth
century “utility consensus” in which “utility managers controlled” the electricity system
through public utility commissions); Horace M. Gray, The Passing of the Public Utility Con-
cept, 16 J. LAND & PUB. UTIL. ECON. 8, 16 (1940).
182. Many of EPA’s actions also implicate clean energy, including most obviously the Obama
Administration’s now-defunct Clean Power Plan, which would have incentivized states to
build out their clean energy infrastructure. But even under the Clean Power Plan, state-level
institutions would have had primary responsibility for determining how to orchestrate such a
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As state legislatures increase their activity relating to clean energy, some
have considered the distributional implications of these new laws. Most nota-
bly, California’s legislature has explicitly instructed the California Air Resource
Board—the state’s primary climate regulator—to take into account distribu-
tional impacts as it designs the state’s decarbonization strategy, and in some
cases has demanded that particular percentages of program resources go to dis-
advantaged communities.183 But legislatures often do not prescribe clean energy
laws at this level of detail.184 Instead, distributional implications are often
worked out through policies set at the sub-legislative level—most often, in state
PUCs.185 Nowadays, in addition to performing the rate setting duties described
in Part II, PUCs have responsibility for implementing state clean energy
goals—including renewable portfolio standards, net metering policies, “smart
grid” investments, energy efficiency standards, and energy storage policies.
These programs combine highly technical areas of grid management with sig-
nificant political, value-laden choices about balancing the interests of consum-
ers, investors, and the public.186
PUCs most frequently operate through adjudication rather than rulemak-
ing—in other words, in piecemeal fashion.187 “Rate cases” focus on setting the
rates for each utility in the state based on the utility’s investment landscape and
buildout. See Michael A. Livermore, The Perils of Experimentation, 126 YALE L.J. 636,
690–91 (2017).
183. See Alice Kaswan, A Broader Vision for Climate Policy: Lessons from California, 9 SAN DIEGO
J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 83 (2018) (describing many California laws that require CARB
to explicitly address distributional implications); see also Ill. Future Jobs Act, S.B. 2814 (ef-
fective June 1, 2017) (creating, inter alia, a “Solar for All” program aimed at bringing solar to
low-income communities).
184. See Welton, Grasping for Energy Democracy, supra note 1, at 592; see also William T. Gor- R
mley, John Hondley & Charles Williams, Potential Responsiveness in the Bureaucracy: Views of
Public Utility Regulation, 77 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 704, 705 (Sept. 1983) [hereinafter Gor-
mley et al., Potential Responsiveness] (“Legislative mandates governing utility regulation are
typically vague, ambiguous, and unconfining.”).
185. See Welton, Grasping for Energy Democracy, supra note 1, at 592–93. R
186. Stefan H. Krieger, An Advocacy Model for Representation of Low-Income Intervenors in State
Public Utility Proceedings, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 639, 648 (1990) [hereinafter Krieger, Representa-
tion of Low-Income Intervenors] (observing how the issues considered by commissions “by
their very nature require balancing of different political, social, and economic interests”).
187. See William J. Hausman & John L. Neufeld, How Politics, Economics, and Institutions Shaped
Electric Utility Regulation in the United States: 1879-2009, 53 BUS. HIST. 723, 724–25
(describing commissions as “quasi-judicial agencies” that operate through fact-specific hear-
ings); Stefan H. Krieger, Problems for Captive Ratepayers in Nonunanimous Settlements of
Public Utility Rate Cases, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 257, 278–79 (1995) [hereinafter Krieger,
Problems for Captive Ratepayers] (describing the trial-like nature of PUC proceedings); see
also Adam R. Fremeth, Guy L.F. Holburn & Pablo T. Spiller, The Impact of Consumer
Advocates on Regulatory Policy in the Electric Utility Sector, 161 PUB. CHOICE 157, 161 (2014)
(“Regulatory policy in the utilities sector is determined primarily by periodic rate reviews
conducted by PUCs.”).
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its customer base.188 Some PUCs have moved in recent years toward greater use
of more flexible and open procedures, including rulemaking proceedings, often
to set the overall tone and structure for modernization of the grid.189 Neverthe-
less, PUCs still tend to implement new policies on a utility-by-utility basis. So,
for example, Minnesota’s ambitions to change the way that utilities earn
money—so as to incentivize more clean energy and energy efficiency—is begin-
ning with a rate case devoted specifically to the state’s largest utility.190 Even
New York—which began a major utility reform in 2016 with a commission-
driven rulemaking—is now implementing its sweeping policy changes by hav-
ing utilities file utility-specific “distributed system implementation plans.”191
Participating in the clean energy transformation thus often requires de-
tailed involvement in utility-specific adjudicatory processes. Nominally, most
who wish to participate in these rate cases can.192 But practically, this frag-
mented space for policymaking, with its dense, technical, and time- and re-
source-intensive processes, presents a challenge for broad participation.193
Indeed, these features of clean energy policymaking suggest that procedu-
ral justice within this field may face even more hurdles than procedural justice
188. See Fremeth et al., supra note 187; Hausman & Neufeld, supra note 187, at 723–24. R
189. See Douglas N. Jones, Agency Transformation and State Public Utility Commissions, 14 UTIL.
POL’Y 8, 11 (2006) [hereinafter Jones, Agency Transformation] (observing that PUCs have
modified their “core missions” to “make greater use of collaborative processes, mediation
skills, pre-litigation resolution, stipulations, [and] utility/regulator public roundtables (as
against formal adjudicatory hearings)”); see also examples of rulemaking collected in infra
Appendix.
190. See, e.g., In The Matter Of A Commission Investigation To Identify And Develop Perform-
ance Metrics And, Potentially, Incentives For Xcel Energy’s Electric Utility Operations,
Docket No. 17-401 (Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Sept. 22, 2017).
191. See Proceeding on Motion of the Commission in Regard to Reforming the Energy Vision —
Distributed System Implementation Plan for New York State Electric & Gas Corporation
and Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation, Case 14-M-010, (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n
June 30, 2016).
192. Hausman & Neufeld, supra note 187, at 724–25. Commissions typically have latitude in R
determining who should be allowed to intervene in a utility rate case, and tend to allow all
persons with an interest to participate. See Krieger, Problems for Captive Ratepayers, supra
note 187, at 276; Robert B. Leflar & Martin H. Rogol, Consumer Participation in the Regula- R
tion of Public Utilities: A Model Act, 13 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 235, 244–45 (1976) (noting that
commissions have liberalized the rules regarding who can participate in proceedings). Inter-
venors “have a right to appear in person or through an attorney, to introduce evidence, and
to cross examine witnesses.” Krieger, Problems for Captive Ratepayers, supra note 187, at 276. R
Nevertheless, Holburn and Bergh found that without consumer advocates, “consumers faced
hurdles in accessing ratemaking procedures.” Guy L.F. Holburn & Richard G. Vanden
Bergh, Consumer Capture of Regulatory Institutions: The Creation of Public Utility Consumer
Advocates in the United States, 126 PUB. CHOICE 45, 47 (2006).
193. See Krieger, Representation of Low-Income Intervenors, supra note 186, at 650; Leflar & R
Rogol, supra note 192, at 236 (“Residential utility consumers often have found the obstacles R
to effective public participation in the regulatory process overwhelming.”).
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within environmental law. Both fields deal with challenging scientific issues,
but environmental regulators use rulemaking more often than adjudication,194
which allows for more streamlined participation. Much environmental lawmak-
ing is also concentrated at the federal level,195 whereas the state-centered nature
of clean energy policies presents an additional challenge for clean energy justice
advocates. For a group to have a regional or national impact, it has to partici-
pate in multiple proceedings across multiple states.
That said, federal- and regional-level proceedings also raise clean energy
justice concerns. State proceedings govern “retail” electricity sales—that is, lo-
calized interactions between a utility and its customers.196 States also oversee the
siting of energy infrastructure within their borders.197 In contrast, FERC is in
charge of matters related to sales of power at “wholesale” between utilities, or
between merchant generators and utilities.198 Since moving from its historic role
of adjudicating prices to its modern role of ensuring the smooth and fair func-
tioning of markets,199 FERC has entered into rulemakings that impact the clean
energy transition far more frequently.200 In the last several years, FERC has
made rules on how to compensate demand response, energy storage, and energy
efficiency in wholesale markets,201 and on how to ensure that the buildout of
transmission infrastructure matches state renewable energy goals.202 These rules
all implicate distributive justice, but less overtly than state proceedings, given
the attenuated link between energy users and wholesale markets.203 So although
FERC rulemaking follows the familiar and more economical notice-and-com-
ment process, it can be challenging even for sophisticated parties to understand
the distributional implications of FERC’s policies. For example, Sharon Jacobs
194. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Rulemaking Versus Adjudication: A Psychological Perspective, 32 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 529, 530–31 (2005).
195. See Lazarus, supra note 10, at 820 (noting the national focus of environmental protection R
policy).
196. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 824(a)–(b)(1) (2012).
197. See Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Util. Control v. FERC, 569 F.3d 477, 481 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
198. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 824(a)–(c).
199. See Hammond & Spence, supra note 55, at 143. R
200. See Major Orders & Regulations, FERC, https://perma.cc/4AJ8-PZ6S.
201. See supra note 79. R
202. See Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating
Public Utilities, Order 1000, 76 Fed. Reg. 49,841, 49,846 (Aug. 11, 2011) (to be codified at
18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
203. A new analysis based on an examination of actual dispatch in the markets over a 10-year
period finds that markets produce savings over traditional regulation. See generally Steve Ci-
cala, Imperfect Markets Versus Imperfect Regulation in U.S. Electricity Generation (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 23,053, 2017), https://perma.cc/53K9-A487. But exactly
how the end-use retail rates of various utilities are affected by policy changes in the markets
remains opaque. For example, FERC’s order requiring demand response to be fairly com-
pensated in wholesale markets clearly caused rates to go down, see FERC v. Electric Power
Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 774 (2016), but by how much is not clear.
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suggests that individual “prosumers”—that is, persons generating some of their
own power, often through rooftop solar—are inadequately represented in the
“regulatory dialogue” at FERC.204 And if prosumers—the most sophisticated
consumers—are underrepresented, it is even more likely that disadvantaged
groups do not have a substantial voice.205
Finally, in areas of the country representing two-thirds of the popula-
tion,206 those who wish to ensure a fair transition to clean energy must engage
with yet another type of entity: Regional Transmission Organizations
(“RTOs”).207 These regional scale organizations—of which there are seven
across the United States—jointly plan for and administer each region’s electric-
ity grid and electricity dispatch. RTOs have been called “Frankenstein-like”208
because of their hybrid structure as private membership organizations under
government control.209 FERC oversees RTOs,210 but their membership is com-
prised largely of utilities and other industry players.211
RTO governance occurs through board oversight, guided by complex in-
ternal stakeholder committees and membership-only voting rules.212 These by-
zantine decisionmaking processes are similar to those of standards setting
organizations, as an action taken by the RTO may be passed upon by several
204. Jacobs, supra note 11, at 550–51. R
205. See Jason Pinney, The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and Environmental Justice: Do
the National Environmental Policy Act and the Clean Air Act Offer a Better Way?, 30 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 353, 353 (2003) (arguing that FERC has inadequately incorporated
environmental justice considerations into its decisionmaking processes).
206. About the IRC, ISO/RTO COUNCIL, https://perma.cc/P29T-LZ9R (“Nine ISOs/RTOs
serve two-thirds of electricity consumers in the United States and more than 50 percent of
Canada’s population.”).
207. In states without RTOs, utilities remain vertically integrated monopolies and are in charge
of arranging any outside purchases on their own, without the aid of a coordinated regional
market. See Boyd & Carlson, supra note 44, at 836. R
208. John P. Hughes, President & CEO, Elec. Consumers Res. Council (ELCON), Statement
at FERC Technical Conference: State Policies and Wholesale Markets Operated by ISO-
New England, Inc., New York Independent System Operator, Inc. and PJM Interconnec-
tion L.L.C., at 325 (May 2, 2017), http://perma.cc/R7MN-B7EZ.
209. Christina Simeone, PJM Governance: Can Reforms Improve Outcomes?, KLEINMAN CTR.
FOR ENERGY POL’Y 22 (May 19, 2017), https://perma.cc/X56X-FXWU (“As organiza-
tions, RTO’s are unique in structure, authority, and function.”).
210. See 16 U.S.C. § 824d (2012) (setting forth a requirement that all rates for the sale of electric
energy be “just and reasonable”).
211. See Daniel Greenfield & John Kwoka, The Cost Structure of Regional Transmission Organiza-
tions, 32 ENERGY J. 159, 163 (2011); Michael H. Dworkin & Rachel Aslin Goldwasser,
Ensuring Consideration of the Public Interest in the Governance and Accountability of Regional
Transmission Organizations, 28 ENERGY L.J. 543, 548 (2007) (explaining that RTOs are
“between government and business”); ISO/RTO Council, About 60% of the U.S. Electric
Power Supply is Managed by RTOs, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Apr. 4, 2011), https://per
ma.cc/LYU7-JWEG (explaining the types of members that RTOs have).
212. See Welton, Social Project, supra note 6, at 1109–12. R
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task forces and committees before its ultimate approval.213 Simply discerning
the importance of a particular committee, or the ultimate path to approval of a
particular policy proposal, would be a demanding task for would-be participants
who are not already RTO members.214 Moreover, the highly technocratic issues
that RTOs decide in these settings—including, for example, rules regarding
dispatch order, bidding, and resource compensation in markets215—tend to be
hard to connect directly to justice issues, even though they necessarily have
implications for how the benefits and burdens of clean energy are spread.216
Thus, as one seasoned industry participant put it, to engage successfully “you
have to be a combination of an economist and a math wizard.”217
In sum, energy governance is fragmented across scales and across issues,
with adjudication remaining the dominant form of decisionmaking. For all of
these reasons, the myriad institutions responsible for clean energy decisionmak-
ing are challenging spaces in which to summon the bandwidth necessary to
ensure that justice considerations receive their due.
B. The Participants in Energy Proceedings
The second challenge to achieving procedural justice in the clean energy
transition relates to the parties that participate in energy proceedings. Utilities,
clean energy companies, large environmental groups, and consumer protection
advocates take center stage, and have interests often at odds with those advocat-
ing for clean energy justice.
Utilities dominate energy proceedings with their expertise and resources,
allowing them to wield outsized influence in many cases.218 They have com-
213. See Seth Blumsack et al., Can Capacity Markets Be Designed by Democracy?, 50 PROC. HAW.
INT’L CONF. SYSTEM SCI. 3075, 3076 (2017) (describing PJM’s multi-layered committee
structure).
214. See Benjamin A. Stafford & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Winds of Change in Energy Systems: Policy
Implementation, Technology Deployment, and Regional Transmission Organizations, 21 EN-
ERGY RES. & SOC. SCI. 222, 229–30 (2016) (describing the complex norms and tacit knowl-
edge that permeate stakeholder processes at MISO, the Midwestern grid operator).
215. Hammond & Spence, supra note 55, at 153–57. R
216. To take just one current example, FERC’s recent order approving a new structure for New
England’s capacity market has caused many to object that markets will shortchange state
clean energy goals through the use of a complex two-stage auction mechanism, which pro-
vides a “severance payment” to retiring fossil fuel generators at the expense of regional rate-
payers. See Order on Tariff Filing, ISO-NE, 162 FERC ¶ 61,205, para. 7 (Mar. 9, 2018).
217. Stafford & Wilson, supra note 214, at 230 (quoting an interviewee in their project). R
218. Cf. William T. Gormley, Jr., Statewide Remedies for Public Underrepresentation in Regulatory
Proceedings, 41 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 454, 454 (1981) [hereinafter Gormley, Statewide Reme-
dies]; Leflar, supra note 192, at 241 (“Utility commission staffs are traditionally under- R
manned and underfunded. Consequently, staffs frequently exhibit a tendency to subject the
carefully prepared analyses of the data submitted by the utility company to less than critical
scrutiny. . . .”).
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mand of the complex technical and economic aspects of the proceedings, and
the ability to develop the necessary supporting evidence.219 In state proceedings,
consumers are by no means unrepresented, but many “consumer” participants
represent large businesses and industrial consumers, whose interests frequently
diverge from those of residential consumers in general and low-income con-
sumers in particular.220 Environmental groups—particularly “big green”
groups—now also often participate in front of PUCs, RTOs, and FERC, given
the importance of energy law to combatting climate change.221 Sometimes—no
doubt having learned from experiences in the environmental justice move-
ment—these groups partner with smaller community environmental groups
and raise concerns of distributive justice.222
But unlike environmental justice, there is an enormous for-profit angle to
clean energy advocacy, as solar, wind, and energy storage companies all amplify
support for clean energy.223 These companies provide powerful corporate voices
in favor of the rapid expansion of clean energy that can often have substantial
impacts on state and federal policies.224 But these companies are often not at-
tuned to justice concerns related to clean energy, given that their aim is to
maximize profits and create economic and job growth.225
That said, many PUCs do have an institutionalized role for consumer pro-
tection. Forty-three states have some form of “consumer advocate,”226 tasked
219. See Leflar, supra note 192, at 241. R
220. See Gormley, Statewide Remedies, supra note 218, at 454; see also About IECA, INDUSTRIAL R
ENERGY CONSUMERS OF AM., https://perma.cc/QZ99-SF5R (describing trade group spe-
cifically representing industrial customers).
221. See, e.g., Order on Tariff Filing, supra note 216 (showing filings by joint clean energy advo-
cates on reforms affecting New England’s clean energy policy); Earthjustice, Comment on
Transforming Maryland’s Electric Distribution Systems, PC 44 (Md. Pub. Serv. Comm’n
Oct. 28, 2016) (on file with author) (filing on behalf of a coalition of environmental groups).
222. See Earthjustice, supra note 221. R
223. See Eric Biber, Nina Kelsey & Jonas Meckling, The Political Economy of Decarbonization: A
Research Agenda, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 605, 625 (2017) (describing the political winners likely
to support decarbonization policies).
224. For example, Tesla’s and Sunrun’s decision to pull out of Nevada after the state ended its
support for rooftop solar reportedly played a significant role in the legislature’s decision to
reinstate the policy less than a year later. See Nevada Reinstates Key Solar Policy, REUTERS
(June 15, 2017), https://perma.cc/ZH96-2C2P.
225. See Herman K. Trabish, Sunrun CEO: Why Utilities Are Attacking Net Metering, GREEN-
TECHMEDIA (June 12, 2013), https://perma.cc/V59E-CPD4 (“Net metering is a key com-
ponent of the value proposition through which [solar installers] benefit, a value proposition
that has dramatically driven the growth of solar.”).
226. Who We Are, NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE UTIL. CONSUMER ADVOCATES, https://perma.cc/
GX2V-TQTA. These can be standalone offices (as in the case of Maryland’s Office of Pub-
lic Counsel), or branches of Attorneys General offices tasked with this responsibility. See id.;
see also PUC Commissioners and Consumer Advocates and Meetings Attended Full List
(spreadsheet on file with authors) (listing the consumer advocates in states, together with
lists of meetings attended).
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with ensuring that consumers’ interests are considered during ratemaking pro-
ceedings.227 Problematically, consumer advocates are often bound by statute,
tradition, or both to push specifically for lowest rates,228 and are unlikely to
provide nuanced advocacy regarding the distributive challenges of clean en-
ergy.229 Quite the contrary: to the extent a PUC is committed to renewable
energy goals, consumer advocates are likely to push for achieving them in the
most cost-effective way possible, with limited attention to the justice implica-
tions of the lowest-cost solutions.230 And while consumer advocates typically
focus on matters of concern to residential consumers, their charge is usually to
lower rates for all consumers, not a particular subset.
In recent years, the PUCs’ purviews have extended beyond rate cases in-
volving traditional utility investments to broader proceedings focusing on new
technologies and new business models (such as grid modernization proceedings
discussed in Part II), and to stakeholder get-togethers designed to inform pol-
icy development. Particularly in these settings, it seems inappropriate to vest
the sole participatory role for the “public” in consumer advocates, given the
wide-ranging nature of the inquiries. For that matter, consumer advocates may
not have any more specialized expertise necessary to evaluate transformative
changes in the industry than other would-be advocates.
C. The Empirics of Clean Energy Participation
Thus far, we have described the challenges of participation mainly at the
level of theory. In this subsection, we describe the results of empirical work that
confirms the challenges of participation at state PUCs. We focus on PUCs as
the most fruitful forum for raising clean energy justice concerns: Because of
PUCs’ focus on the relationship between ratepayers and their utilities, state
utility regulators have more cause to consider the disparate impacts of clean
energy policy on particular groups. Moreover, the issues considered by state
PUCs tend to be at least somewhat more accessible than the complex market
rules negotiated in RTOs and approved by FERC.
227. See Holburn & Vanden Bergh, supra note 192, at 46; Krieger, Representation of Low-Income R
Intervenors, supra note 186, at 644 (detailing the history of consumer advocates). R
228. See Gormley, Statewide Remedies, supra note 218, at 456 (“Grassroots advocates pursue a R
much more diverse range of values than proxy advocates. . . . [P]roxy advocates focus their
attention unequivocally on utility company rate hike requests when they regard such requests
as excessive (which is most of the time).”); Jacobs, supra note 11, at 554. R
229. Cf. Leflar, supra note 192, at 235 (observing that consumer advocate representation of con- R
sumer interests faces many challenges, including the fact that these institutions are not “suf-
ficiently accountable to the people on whose behalf they appear”).
230. Jacobs, supra note 11, at 554–55 (explaining why consumer advocates often fail to represent R
the interests of customers self-generating electricity for similar reasons—because their pri-
mary goal is “keeping the quality of utility service high while keeping consumer prices low”).
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Given the challenges to full and fair participation at PUCs we have dis-
cussed so far, it is logical to ask what we know about participation in these
forums. The short answer is not much—most studies on PUC participation are
now decades old.231 For this reason, we undertook several empirical analyses
regarding participation at PUCs. These analyses focused on three aspects of
PUC participation: the role of consumer advocates in policymaking; the partici-
pation of community groups in PUC rulemakings; and the backchannel meth-
ods that utilities use to curry favor with PUC commissioners. In this
subsection, we describe the ways in which our empirical findings confirm the
utility-dominated PUC landscape described above.
Our research suggests that most states continue to rely on consumer advo-
cates as the primary representatives of electricity consumers. We analyzed par-
ticipation in 20 meetings of the Critical Consumer Issues Forum (“CCIF”), a
group formed in 2010 to discuss transformative matters such as integrating dis-
tributed energy resources into the electric grid.232 None of its meetings have
included “consumer” attendees other than state consumer advocates.233 This is
not surprising, given that its stated purpose is “to provide an opportunity for
state commissioners, consumer advocates, and energy company representatives
to collectively tackle tough consumer issues through unique, highly interactive
discourse.”234 CCIF summits often take place concurrently with major meetings
of electric utility regulators, most notably meetings of the National Association
of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (“NARUC”), which ordinary citizens
cannot attend (at least not without paying substantial fees). The group has pro-
duced reports on grid modernization policy, and while it explicitly disclaims a
connection to individual PUC cases, some PUC proceedings cite its reports as a
purportedly unbiased source of information.235
Another forum in which consumer advocates are increasingly taking part is
proceedings at the RTOs. The PJM RTO, for example, has had a “Consumer
Advocates of the PJM States” since 2013 comprised of the consumer advocates
231. See infra note 237 and accompanying text. R
232. Katrina J. McMurrian, Including the Consumer in the Grid, HILL (June 9, 2014), https://per
ma.cc/2MZ2-FR9P.
233. Critical Customer Issues Forum Annual Meeting Attendees 2011–16 (spreadsheet on file
with authors).
234. CRITICAL CONSUMER ISSUES FORUM, https://perma.cc/VC9F-YAPK.
235. See, e.g., Tucson Elec. Pwr. Co. and UNS Electric, Inc. Comments to Staff Report and
Proposed Order, Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, No. E-O1345A-13-0248, at 4–5 (Nov. 4, 2013)
(citing and attaching the CCIF report on principles for setting rates related to distributed
generation). The CCIF receives funding from the Edison Electric Institute, the major trade
association for large investor-owned utilities. See, e.g., Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Advisory
Op., Critical Consumer Issues Forum Spring Summit, Apr. 6. 2015 (on file with authors)
(noting that the EEI provided all of the funding for a CCIF meeting). As such, there may
also be reason to believe that its reports are skewed toward positions favored by utilities.
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from all states in the region.236 As a regional group, it faces distinct challenges
in representing the “public” of the region: If the state advocates disagree with
one another about RTO policies or proposals, they may not be able to present a
unified voice, further diluting their potential impact.
Beyond utilities and consumer advocates, we know little about participa-
tion rates or experiences in PUC proceedings. The last substantial studies on
this topic occurred in the 1970s and 1980s.237 Unsurprisingly, these studies con-
firm our conclusions that utilities and large industrial customers tended to
dominate proceedings and obtain favorable results.238 Consumer advocates and
“grassroots” groups were perceived as “influential” in some states—but re-
mained entirely inactive in others.239
To obtain a more contemporary understanding of citizen group participa-
tion at PUCs, we analyzed major proceedings in twelve states in fall 2017.240
The results from this snapshot analysis should be taken as a best-case scenario,
as we focused on significant public policy dockets most likely to attract citizen
attention, not utility-specific rate case adjudications. All of the dockets we ex-
amined were rulemaking efforts to promote clean energy.
Our analysis showed that community groups241 comprised 45 of 815 filing
parties across these twelve proceedings—around 5.5%.242 Is that a lot? It is hard
to establish a baseline against which to compare. Studies of federal rulemakings
have found participation rates in similar ranges, and have largely considered
236. CONSUMER ADVOCATES OF THE PJM STATES, https://perma.cc/J4RC-HCYW.
237. See Jones, Agency Transformation, supra note 189, at 9; Krieger, Problems for Captive Ratepay-
ers, supra note 187, at 279–80. See generally William T. Gormley, Public Advocacy in Public R
Utility Commission Proceedings, 17 J. APPLIED BEHAV. SCI. 446 (1981) [hereinafter Gor-
mley, Public Advocacy]; Gormley, Statewide Remedies, supra note 218; Gormley et al., Poten- R
tial Responsiveness, supra note 184 (finding that citizen activists and PUC commissioners care R
about many of the same issues, but do not concur on the relevant “values”); Leflar & Rogol,
supra note 192. Before this time, consumer participation in ratemakings was considerably R
rarer, as declining electricity rates through the 1960s created little appetite for reform.
238. See William T. Gormley, Alternative Models of the Regulatory Process: Public Utility Regula-
tion in the United States, 25 W. POL. Q. 297, 298 (1982).
239. Gormley finds that consumer advocates are typically perceived to be “either moderately in-
fluential or very influential.” Id. at 306–11. A 2002 study found that the participation of a
consumer advocate reduced the rate of return that utilities were allowed to earn “by approxi-
mately 0.19 to 0.37 percentage points.” Holburn & Vanden Bergh, supra note 192, at 49; see R
also Fremeth et al., supra note 187, at 157. R
240. See infra Appendix.
241. We included any state or local not-for-profit or loosely formed group of local residents
within the category of “community group.” We did not include comments filed exclusively
by large environmental not-for-profits, except in those instances where they were joined by a
community group fitting the above definition.
242. Community group participation rates ranged from 0% in Texas, to 10.9% in New York. See
Appendix tbl.3.
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such levels inadequate.243 Whether we should be more or less demanding in
terms of participation levels at the state level, as compared to the federal, is a
normative question that empirics alone cannot answer. Many arguments in
favor of state regulation seem to presume that it should engender greater citizen
participation244—suggesting that our 5.5% figure should provoke skepticism as
to whether states have achieved full and fair participation in PUC proceedings.
Perhaps more useful are our qualitative findings regarding the issues that
community groups raise to their PUCs. Thirty-four of the forty-five participat-
ing community groups articulated concerns relating to distributive justice in
their comments.245 Twenty-six groups also raised concerns specifically about
procedural justice—that is, how the proceedings themselves facilitated (or failed
to facilitate) wide participation.246 Many comments confirmed long-standing
observations about the deeply technical nature of PUC proceedings, even on
topics of interest to the wider community. For example, the group “Cooperative
Energy Futures” had this to say about Minnesota’s “Commission Inquiry into
Grid Modernization”:
Proceedings tend to focus extensively on technical parameters, often
with little consideration of what (and who) our energy system is for.
To the extent that they do so, they eliminate most of the scope of
issues that many grassroots groups representing energy users are in-
terested and qualified to comment on and avoid the most fundamen-
tal questions around how our system should be regulated.247
Groups in other states expressed similar sentiments.248
The evidence is not all grim. One of us elsewhere has detailed how New
York’s commission, when prompted by ratepayers to consider how the issues of
energy poverty and energy regulatory reform intersected, engendered substantial
participation and attendant reforms.249 There, through public hearing testimony
243. See Marissa Martino Golden, Interest Groups in the Rule-Making Process: Who Participates?
Whose Voices Get Heard?, 8 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 245, 253, 256 (1998) (finding
citizen participation in federal rulemaking between 0 and 11%, with particularly little repre-
sentation of “the poor”).
244. See Miriam Seifter, Further from the People? The Puzzle of State Administration, 93 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 107, 111 (2018).
245. See infra Appendix.
246. See id.
247. Coop. Energy Futures, Comments on 11/20/2015 Stakeholder Meeting on Grid Moderni-
zation Panel, at 4 (on file with authors).
248. See Comments of D.C. Climate Action, Re: Formal Case No. 1130, D.C. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n 6 (Apr. 10, 2017); Comments of DC Solar United Neighborhoods, Re: Formal
Case No. 1130, D.C. Pub. Serv. Comm’n (Mar. 6, 2017); VIRGINIA LYONS ET AL., REC-
OMMENDATIONS TO PROMOTE INCREASED EASE OF CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN PSB
PROCEEDINGS 30 (2016), https://perma.cc/V855-3GHA.
249. See generally Welton, Grid Modernization and Energy Poverty, supra note 45. R
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of 100 predominantly low-income residents—totaling 600 transcribed pages—
the Commission was able to capture a considerably deeper understanding of
New Yorkers’ lived experiences of energy poverty.250 The Commission ex-
plained that this understanding helped to fuel its decision to substantially ex-
pand New York’s commitment to assisting low-income ratepayers, and to link
more closely its proceedings related to clean energy and energy affordability.251
We will return in the final section of the paper to consider what lessons exper-
iences like New York’s might offer to the broadening clean energy justice
movement.
But New York may be an outlier—access to proceedings does not always
translate into the ability to influence decisionmakers. Regulatory capture re-
mains a perennial problem in energy regulation.252 Utility commissioners con-
tinue to receive free travel and other financial benefits from the companies they
regulate—with unknown and largely unknowable impacts on commissioners’
decisions.253 The full extent of this practice is difficult to discern, but a survey of
outside groups’ funding of commissioners’ conference travel expenditures in
more than twenty states offers one measure of the problem. Attention has been
called to this sort of activity in the press, and for good reason: The coziness that
comes from unfettered access to regulators in a resort or other comfortable set-
ting, away from public scrutiny, almost inevitably will have policy ramifications.
To understand the extent to which such purchased access continues, we
examined public records regarding two different types of conferences: those
sponsored by individual utilities and by the CCIF. A number of these meetings
are scheduled in conjunction with the regular national and regional meetings of
utility commissioners, for which travel is normally reimbursed by the states. To
that end, we compiled lists of attendees at all NARUC meetings from 2010 to
2016, the meetings of its regional affiliates, CCIF meetings, and other relevant
conferences for which attendance lists were available.254 We then made public
records requests in more than twenty states for travel records from individual
commissioners to determine when some or all travel was underwritten by a
third party for attendance at a separate event.255
250. See id. at 600–01.
251. See id. at 601.
252. On capture generally, see Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J.
ECON. & MGT. SCI. 335, 341–42 (1974); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regula-
tion, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971).
253. Opinion, Too Cozy with Regulators, POST & COURIER (Jan. 3, 2018), https://perma.cc/
32CT-X4MZ.
254. Full list of PUC Commissioners and Consumer Advocates and Meetings Attended (unpub-
lished spreadsheet) (on file with authors).
255. On some occasions, the records indicate that commissioners attended standalone meetings
wholly sponsored by utilities or the CCIF. We analyzed those as well.
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While the analysis is currently ongoing, some preliminary conclusions may
be drawn. Third parties have indeed provided travel reimbursement, hospitality
and other benefits to commissioners to attend conferences and meetings. Indi-
vidual commissioners occasionally obtain ethics memos from state attorneys
general or comparable entities that describe the reimbursement by third parties
as permissible, usually because the conferences did not involve specific matters
currently pertaining before the commissions.256 This strikes us as overly hair-
splitting, as commission proceedings are almost entirely made up of repeat util-
ity players. Hospitality provided today could make commissioners more trusting
and accepting of utility positions raised in future proceedings. Moreover, most
PUCs tend to have one or more members who attend policy conferences dis-
proportionately more than their colleagues. And so, we can expect that the
influence of compensating “frequent flyers” for attendance at conferences will
be magnified by the fact that they can subsequently influence their colleagues.
Utility-funded travel and hospitality is just one way in which these entities
dominate proceedings, but it provides a telling window into the ways in which
utilities maintain their influence with the commissions charged with regulating
them. And outsized utility influence should be particularly worrisome in the
clean energy rulemaking proceedings we discuss here, given that utilities are
wielding power over matters of considerably broader import to society than
mere nickel-and-diming over per-kilowatt-hour rates.
D. Litigation as an Antidote?
We have not painted a rosy picture of the potential for robust procedural
justice in clean energy proceedings. Although routes exist for intervention into
the largely adjudicatory world of clean energy policymaking, they remain chal-
lenging for the reasons discussed above.257 A lawyer’s instinct under these con-
ditions is often to turn to the courts to remedy deficiencies perceived in the
administrative process. But as in the environmental justice context, litigation is
an unlikely remedy here.
Many in the environmental law world have long seen litigation as an im-
portant antidote to the challenges of getting agencies to take environmental
considerations seriously. Particularly during the 1970s, prominent environmen-
tal nonprofits famously shaped the character of newly passed iconic federal en-
256. See, e.g., Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, supra note 235 (concluding that Commissioner Lisa Polak R
Edgar’s attendance at a CCIF meeting fully reimbursed by the EEI was in “full compliance
with the gift, public comment, and ex parte provisions of Florida law”).
257. Cf. Susan Webb Yackee, Sweet-Talking the Fourth Branch: The Influence of Interest Group
Comments on Federal Agency Rulemaking, 16 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 103, 104
(2006) (observing that “law provides the public the right to participate in—but not the right
to influence—rulemaking”).
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vironmental statutes through the courts.258 But litigation worked considerably
less well for environmental justice concerns.259 Courts quickly foreclosed the use
of antidiscrimination laws to remedy disparate impacts, including the disparate
siting of environmental hazards.260 Environmental justice plaintiffs could in-
stead attempt to stop particular projects by litigating analytical deficits under
general environmental laws—particularly the National Environmental Policy
Act.261 But even when successful in stopping particular actions, such suits did
little to advance the cause of environmental justice as a national concern, since
the disparate impacts of these actions played no role in the outcome of the
litigation.262 For these reasons, environmental justice advocates came to under-
stand that engaging deeply in political and bureaucratic processes was critical to
secure substantive consideration of the disparate impacts of environmental
harms.263
The same is almost certainly true when it comes to clean energy justice. As
we have explained, energy decisionmaking operates largely under the mantras of
“just and reasonable” and “not unduly discriminatory” rates.264 As interpreted by
courts since the 1940s, these broad standards give commissions wide latitude to
strike the appropriate balance between utilities and consumers, and among dif-
ferent types of consumers.265 The technical intricacy of commission proceedings
makes courts extremely reluctant to second-guess commission decisions as to
what constitutes a “just and reasonable” rate or practice.266 Accordingly, it is
258. See Cole, supra note 26, at 635–36. R
259. See Torres, supra note 10, at 436. R
260. See id. at 439; Bean v. Sw. Waste Mgmt. Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673, 677 (S.D. Tex. 1979)
(refusing preliminary injunction for discrimination in siting of waste facility based on Su-
preme Court precedent requiring a showing of discriminatory purpose, rather than just dis-
parate impact); see also Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
264–65 (1977) (“[O]fficial action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in
a racially disproportionate impact.”).
261. See Kaswan, supra note 10, at 246, 250. R
262. See Torres, supra note 10, at 450 (“[A] claim that relies upon a traditional environmental R
statute often does not necessarily affect the underlying decisionmaking process through
which environmental benefits and burdens are distributed.”).
263. See id. at 452 (“[B]ecause decisions which determine environmental law and policy are often
made at the administrative level (as regulatory decisions), federal, state, and local administra-
tive processes offer unique and invaluable opportunities for assessing and addressing distri-
butional inequities.”).
264. See supra Part II.
265. See Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299 (1989); Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope
Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
266. See Jim Rossi & Christopher Serkin, Energy Exactions, 104 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming
2019) (“Since the New Deal, courts have consistently subjected utility rate setting decisions
(including decisions regarding the allocation of costs among customers) to a fairly deferential
standard of constitutional review.”); see also Janice A. Beecher, The Prudent Regulator: Polit-
ics, Independence, Ethics, and the Public Interest, 29 ENERGY L.J. 586 (2008) (describing the
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unlikely that litigants unsatisfied with a commission’s treatment of distributive
justice concerns would be able to convince a court that the commission had
strayed beyond its mandate.267 For this reason, clean energy justice concerns will
have to be raised and vetted within existing bureaucratic channels—or struc-
tural reforms will have to move the locus of energy decisionmaking away from
these longstanding regulatory bodies.268
VI. SITING CLEAN ENERGY
The final pillar of clean energy justice that we consider in this Article is
clean energy siting. Even though wind and solar energy are often celebrated as
“clean” energy sources because they are both carbon-free and eliminate other air
pollutants,269 they have their own environmental, health, and community conse-
quences.270 For this reason, siting the amount of renewable energy necessary to
decarbonize the electricity sector also raises procedural and distributive justice
concerns. That said, the siting concerns raised by clean energy do not differ
substantially from traditional siting disputes and are well covered in the existing
literature.271 For these reasons, this Part is the shortest of our analysis.
In the subsections that follow, we briefly describe the legal framework
governing clean energy siting before observing how clean energy siting differs
“institutional autonomy” provided to commissions by “regulatory discretion within a ‘zone of
reasonableness’ ”).
267. In the environmental justice context, Luke Cole has gone beyond this practical point to
suggest that even those battles that could be won in court might do a disservice to the move-
ment, by empowering lawyers at the expense of community voices. See Cole, supra note 26, R
at 650.
268. See infra Part VI (discussing alternative, more localized decisionmaking fora).
269. Outka, Environmental Justice in the Renewable Energy Transition, supra note 14, at 81 R
(“Apart from site objections, emissions-free electricity from wind and solar energy serves
environmental justice goals at the policy level and, in most cases, at the community level as
well, offering local environmental justice benefits, not environmental harm.”).
270. Richard Cowell et al., Acceptance, Acceptability and Environmental Justice: The Role of Commu-
nity Benefits in Wind Energy Development, 54 J. ENVTL. PLAN. & MGMT. 539, 539 (2011);
John Copeland Nagle, Green Harms of Green Projects, 27 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL’Y 59, 59–61 (2013); Outka, Environmental Justice in the Renewable Energy Transition,
supra note 14, at 70. R
271. See generally Uma Outka, Siting Renewable Energy: Land Use and Regulatory Context, 37
ECOLOGY L.Q. 1041 (2010) [hereinafter Outka, Siting Renewable Energy]; Nagle, supra
note 270. In particular, Outka’s article comprehensively catalogs many of the concerns we R
touch upon here. See Outka, Siting Renewable Energy, supra, at 1067–1104; see also Ottinger,
supra note 15, at 222 (observing that renewable energy technologies, “as they are currently R
being designed . . . share key characteristics with their predecessors that raise similar envi-
ronmental justice concerns—and present the possibility that we will reproduce old patterns
of injustice even as we transition to new energy technologies.”); Paben, supra note 13, at R
1077–87.
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from conventional siting in ways that might prove relevant for developing a
clean energy justice agenda.
A. New Problems, Old Legal Frameworks
For the most part, the same legal frameworks govern renewable energy
siting as govern traditional energy infrastructure siting.272 Most siting decisions
occur at the state level, with varying degrees of local input.273 Proposed project
developers must typically first obtain a “certificate of public need” from the
PUC, certifying that the project is necessary to help satisfy the state’s electricity
demand.274 Then, the commission proceeds to make a determination about
where to site the proposed facility. Most processes for making these determina-
tions do not take distributive consequences explicitly into account.275 Some-
times, when a project requires a permit from a federal agency—in the case of
renewable energy, typically because it is being constructed on federal land—
federal statutes requiring consideration of environmental and cultural impacts
also apply.276
In contesting the siting of fossil fuel generators and other more traditional
large industrial facilities, environmental justice advocates have long worked to
crack open all of these processes to greater consideration of local voices and
potential disparate impacts.277 The lessons and tactics learned from these ad-
272. On the environmental justice concerns raised by facility siting more generally, see Vicki
Been, What’s Fairness Got to Do With It? Environmental Justice and the Siting of Locally Unde-
sirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1001 (1993); LUKE W. COLE & SHEILA R. FOS-
TER, FROM THE GROUND UP: ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM AND THE RISE OF THE
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT 17 (2001) (focusing on the siting of hazardous
waste facilities).
273. See Alexa Burt Engelman, Against the Wind: Conflicts Over Wind Energy Siting, 41 ENVTL.
L. REP. 10,549, 10,562–64 (2011) (noting how Minnesota handles siting almost exclusively
at the state level, while New York has highly localized processes); Uma Outka, The Renewa-
ble Energy Footprint, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 241, 258 (2011) [hereinafter Outka, Renewable
Energy Footprint] (cataloguing the many states that have moved to a state-centric siting
model, although noting that processes for local input are still the norm).
274. See Outka, Siting Renewable Energy, supra note 271, at 1060. R
275. Outka, Environmental Justice in Renewable Energy, supra note 14, at 105. R
276. The National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) requires specific analysis of environmen-
tal justice concerns before a federal permit can be issued, although it does not require an
agency to act upon the results of that analysis. Kaswan, supra note 10, at 250–51. The Na- R
tional Historic Preservation Act serves as the main source of protection for religious and
cultural concerns, but also functions predominantly in a procedural vein. See Allison M.
Dussias, Room for a (Sacred) View? American Indian Tribes Confront Visual Desecration Caused
by Wind Energy Projects, 38 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 333, 346 (2014) (describing the Act’s tribal
consultation requirements).
277. See George K. Foster, Community Participation in Development, 51 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
39, 41 (2018).
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vances can now be applied to renewable energy, offering communities some
time-tested methods of voicing their concerns.
That said, there is one noteworthy development in siting renewable energy
that may diminish the possibility of utilizing these well-known processes. The
urgent need to site more renewable energy has led many states, and the federal
government, to craft expedited permitting processes for renewables.278 Through
these processes, renewable resources are allowed to skip or shorten several of
the steps that conventional energy resources must go through—thus eliminat-
ing key venues for vindicating the values of procedural justice.279
Appeals to permitting agencies are not the only means of affecting energy
siting decisions. Largely out of frustration with formal processes, communities
have increasingly negotiated private settlements.280 As Professor George K.
Foster reports, it is now relatively common for communities to participate in
industrial developments as “economic actors,” by serving as business partners
with private developers or exacting concessions from such developers.281 Such
concessions can take the form of “Community Benefits Agreements,” which
promise the provision of certain community “goods” in exchange for commu-
nity support of a project,282 or “Good Neighbor Agreements,” which “focus on
mitigating the impacts of industrial activities.”283
These tools that were developed to allay concerns about fossil-fuel pow-
ered industrialization appear adaptable for the clean energy era. Recent research
focused in the United Kingdom—a country further along in its clean energy
transition—has identified these types of contracting mechanisms as “a promi-
nent feature of discussions about renewable energy.”284 That said, as these pro-
278. See Outka, Renewable Energy Footprint, supra note 273, at 268, 270–74 (describing this R
“dominant regulatory trend”); see also Dep’t of Interior, Order No. 3285, Renewable Energy
Development by the Department of the Interior (2009) (streamlining the development of
renewable energy projects on federal lands); Robert L. Glicksman, Solar Energy Development
on the Federal Public Lands: Environmental Trade-Offs on the Road to a Lower-Carbon Future,
3 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 107, 146 (2011) (suggesting that expedited
processes should “raise red flags . . . given the tendency to paper over environmental con-
cerns”); Nagle, supra note 270, at 88. R
279. See Engelman, supra note 273, at 10,563 (observing how these processes eliminate key op- R
portunities for public involvement).
280. See Foster, supra note 277, at 42–43. R
281. Id. at 41.
282. Daniel P. Selmi, The Contract Transformation in Land Use Regulation, 63 STAN. L. REV.
591, 597 (2011) (“In these contracts, developers agree to provide negotiated benefits to a
municipality, such as increased infrastructure, that the city often could not require under its
regulatory authority. In return, the city agrees to allow a specific development and to ‘vest’
the developer’s right to build against any future land use changes.”).
283. Foster, supra note 277, at 84 (“For example, a GNA may require the developer to meet R
specified emissions standards, make disclosures to the public, and establish a monitoring role
for community groups.”).
284. Cowell et al., supra note 270, at 539. R
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liferate, many raise concerns about whether these essentially private agreements
distribute benefits equally within affected communities, and whether communi-
ties have sufficient bargaining power to reach fair terms.285
B. The Justice Challenges of Siting Clean Energy
The “not-in-my-backyard” phenomenon, whereby a community objects to
certain necessary social infrastructure being placed near it rather than another
community, can feel particularly unsympathetic in the case of clean energy.
Whereas one can readily understand the reasons for a community rejecting a
trash incinerator or a hazardous waste dump, it is harder to understand the
rejection of clean energy resources.286 But as wind and solar continue their me-
teoric growth, they will increasingly raise siting concerns of their own.
Much of the community impact of wind and solar energy turns upon
scale—that is, the size of the proposed installation. The smallest-scale installa-
tions—rooftop solar panels—present limited justice concerns, because a prop-
erty owner typically self-selects to install distributed generation. Larger
installations of both wind and solar, however, come with substantial downsides.
Perhaps most glaringly, major wind and solar farms often disrupt the aesthetics
of what was previously a more rural, pastoral landscape.287 Wind turbines can be
two-hundred meters in height, and large farms have hundreds of turbines that
cover up to thirty square miles of space.288 Solar arrays can also be enormous; for
example, the Agua Caliente solar array in Arizona “comprises more than five
million solar panels that span the equivalent of two Central Parks in the desert
285. See Foster, supra note 277, at 98. R
286. That said, certain “clean” energy resources create hazards similar to fossil fuel generation.
Many states include biomass—the burning of organic feedstocks including trees, crops,
animal waste, and sometimes trash—as a component of their renewable portfolio standard.
These “clean” sources of energy release many of the same toxic air pollutants as conventional
power plants—as well as often producing noxious odors that reduce quality of life for sur-
rounding communities. See Outka, Environmental Justice in Renewable Energy, supra note 14, R
at 81–83.
287. See Patrick Devine-Wright & Yuko Howes, Disruption to Place Attachment and the Protection
of Restoration Environments: A Wind Energy Case Study, 30 J. ENVTL. PSYCHOL. 271, 271
(2010) (reporting survey results indicating that local opposition to one project stemmed from
worries of industrialization and the despoiling of scenic landscape); Engelman, supra note
273, at 10,552 (“Aesthetic impacts and viewshed impacts have been continuously identified R
as a central concern to local residents facing wind development.”); Nagle, supra note 270, at R
68.
288. See Ten of the Biggest Turbines, WIND POWER MONTHLY (July 5, 2017), https://perma.cc/
32DC-UUYS (reporting that the largest onshore wind turbine has a rotor diameter of 167
meters, with a total height over 200 meters); Praveen Duddu, Top 10 Biggest Wind Farms,
POWER TECHNOLOGY (Sept. 29, 2013), https://perma.cc/45G7-JBNB (chronicling the ten
biggest wind farms in the world, eight of which are in the United States).
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between Yuma and Phoenix.”289 Moreover, large solar and wind farms rarely
come alone—they also require the siting and construction of transmission lines
to transport their electricity to demand-heavy population centers.290
These expansive land requirements create distinctive challenges, particu-
larly because appropriate sites are not evenly distributed among U.S. communi-
ties.291 The need for large parcels leads to frequent siting of renewables on
federal land,292 creating tensions with Native American tribes worried about
cultural impacts.293 Because a single renewable project can affect one hundred
archeological sites, its cultural footprint may be higher than that of coal, even as
other concerns are diminished.294
Similarly, the urban-rural divide is more pronounced when it comes to
renewable energy siting.295 Renewable facilities—unlike conventional genera-
tion—can rarely be sited near major population centers. Instead, they must be
located where physical conditions are best—which for wind, means the sparsely
populated Great Plains states, and for solar, the desert Southwest.296 Because of
these geographies of renewable energy, rural populations are often asked to ac-
cept the localized burdens of renewable energy and transmission built to serve
distant coastal cities.297 These burdens include not just aesthetic transformation,
289. Roni Jacobson, World’s Largest Solar Array Set to Crank Out 290 Megawatts of Sunshine
Power, SCI. AM. (May 9, 2014), https://perma.cc/DD64-JY3G.
290. Engelman, supra note 273, at 10,552 (“The installation and operation of utility-scale wind R
turbines requires the building of infrastructure, such as roads and transmission lines to trans-
port energy to the utility grid.”); Outka, Renewable Energy Footprint, supra note 273, at R
243–44 (describing the “energy sprawl” that will accompany the renewable buildout).
291. Joseph Rand & Ben Hoen, Thirty Years of North American Wind Energy Acceptance Research:
What Have We Learned?, 29 ENERGY RES. & SOC. SCI. 135, 136 (2017) (“[T]he rapid
growth of North American wind energy has increased the footprint of wind developments,
increasing local conflicts and bringing the issue of community acceptance to the forefront.”);
see also Roopali Phadke, Public Deliberation and the Geographies of Wind Justice, 22 SCI. AS
CULTURE 247, 247 (2013) (“Across the industrialized world, from the UK to New Zealand,
utility and community scale renewable energy projects are increasingly struggling to get their
environmental permits because of local protests.”).
292. Outka, Renewable Energy Footprint, supra note 273, at 280; Glicksman, supra note 278, at R
110.
293. See Dussias, supra note 276, at 335; Glicksman, supra note 278, at 151 (describing the poten- R
tial benefits and drawbacks to tribes of siting renewables on their lands); Nagle, supra note
270, at 71–72. R
294. See Nagle, supra note 270, at 72. R
295. See Phadke, supra note 291, at 248. R
296. See Wind Maps, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB. (Apr. 6, 2019), https://perma.cc/PTS6-
5XXP; Solar Energy Potential, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY (Apr. 6, 2019), https://perma.cc/
U8BK-VVLE.
297. See Rand & Hoen, supra note 291, at 139; Phadke, supra note 291, at 248 (“Rural communi- R
ties at the forefront of new energy development are asking why they are disproportionately
being asked to carry the weight of the new carbon economy while urban residents continue
their conspicuous use of energy.”).
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but several health and safety concerns. Rotating wind turbine blades can pro-
duce “shadow flicker,” creating enervating “intermittent shadows on adjacent
lands and buildings.”298 Although the noise created by wind farms typically does
not exceed EPA-established acceptable decibel levels, residents living nearby
often complain about noise pollution.299 More controversially, many residents
also report a combination of uncomfortable health symptoms, sometimes called
“Wind Turbine Syndrome,” that stem from living too close to wind farms.300
Is the rural/urban divide in clean energy a consideration of “justice”? We
understand why it might feel unfair to rural communities to bear these burdens
for their urban neighbors. It remains unclear whether those rural communities
likely to be most burdened with renewable energy are also low-income and/or
minority.301 Empirical work on this point—especially as renewable energy de-
velopment continues to accelerate—should be a research priority.
Finally, communities often complain about being shut out of decisionmak-
ing processes regarding the location and size of renewable projects.302 These
concerns overlap with the larger issues of procedural justice raised by clean en-
ergy, discussed in Part V. But they can become particularly acute at the siting
stage, once a community feels it is being targeted for an undue share of infra-
structure. And these participatory challenges are exacerbated by expedited siting
processes.303 The final part, to which we now turn, explores how understanding
these siting concerns as part of a more unified clean energy justice agenda
might open up new possibilities for advancing clean energy justice.
VII. MOVING CLEAN ENERGY JUSTICE FORWARD
In this final Part we assemble the pieces, asking what good it does to
collect this litany of concerns about the justice of clean energy in a single law
review article. To date, most elements of the agenda outlined in this Article
298. Engelman, supra note 273, at 10,552. R
299. Id. at 10,552, 10,555; Nagle, supra note 270, at 71. R
300. See Engelman, supra note 273, at 10,552–53 (noting reports of this phenomenon and studies R
disputing its existence).
301. On the whole, “rural Americans have lower household median incomes than urban house-
holds, but people living in rural areas have lower poverty rates than their urban counterparts.”
Alemayehu Bishaw & Kirby G. Posey, A Comparison of Rural and Urban America: Household
Income and Poverty, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 8, 2016), https://perma.cc/9S7T-7QT8.
302. Engelman, supra note 273, at 10,561 (“These concerns may be better explained in a procedu- R
ral justice paradigm.”); Cowell et al., supra note 270, at 543 (suggesting that Demark and R
Germany have had lots of success in siting renewables because of community control over
the shape of development, not merely the offer of ownership shares); Mhairi Aitken, Wind
Power and Community Benefits: Challenges and Opportunities, 38 ENERGY POL’Y 6066, 6067
(2010); Phadke, supra note 291, at 251 (describing use of “landscape symposium” to obtain R
more meaningful local input on siting and scale).
303. Outka, Environmental Justice in Renewable Energy, supra note 14, at 114. R
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have been discussed in discrete, siloed proceedings: a net metering fight here, a
siting dispute there, a push at the state legislature for more green jobs in low-
income communities, or a plea to RTOs for more transparent procedures. But
these issues intersect and tackling them in concert might prove more successful.
We offer below a few observations on the synergies that a united clean energy
justice agenda presents, and hope that readers may have noticed more of their
own.
A. A Broader Conception of Energy Law’s Justice Rhetoric
As we have noted throughout this Article, energy law’s Progressive-era
roots produced federal and state statutes with key terms that sound in justice,
including the requirements of universal access, “just and reasonable rates,” and
no undue discrimination.304 Historically, the “just and reasonable” standard has
gotten the most attention, and it has predominantly been interpreted to put a
lower bound on rates, requiring that they be non-confiscatory vis-a`-vis the util-
ity.305 Undue discrimination has gotten less attention in utility rate-setting, ex-
cept as it concerns the balance struck in rates and tariff conditions among
industrial, commercial, and residential consumers.306
But PUCs have broad latitude in how they interpret these terms,307 open-
ing up space for creative arguments about their relevance in the clean energy
transition. The concept of “no undue discrimination” has gotten traction in the
net metering context, where regulators have amended compensation rates to
reverse unfair subsidization from lower-income to more affluent consumers on
this basis. Similarly, it undergirded New York’s Public Service Commission’s
concern about energy poverty in its major grid modernization proceeding—and
304. Boyd, supra note 44. R
305. See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 600–01 (1944); Bluefield
Waterworks & Imp. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of W. Va., 262 U.S. 679, 690 (1923).
306. See, e.g., Pub. Util. Comm’n of State of Cal. v. FERC, 24 F.3d 275, 282 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(rejecting a challenge that a FERC-approved natural gas funding plan would unfairly burden
residential customers); Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 820 F.2d 733, 739 (5th Cir.
1987) (describing “undue discrimination” as asking whether “similarly situated customers
were treated differently without justification”). Prohibiting “undue discrimination” is also the
foundation of virtually all modern FERC actions to establish and oversee market mecha-
nisms, but in this context it guarantees that industry participants are not treated unfairly vis-
a`-vis one another. See Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid,
supra note 53, at 1812. R
307. Indeed, Justice Frankfurter’s dissent in the iconic Hope case suggests that the significant
problem raised by the modern “just and reasonable” inquiry is that it leaves rates entirely “to
the unguided discretion of the Commission.” 320 U.S. at 626 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting);
see also Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 310 (1989) (“Today we reaffirm these
teachings of Hope Natural Gas: ‘[I]t is not theory but the impact of the rate order which
counts. If the total effect of the rate order cannot be said to be unreasonable, judicial in-
quiry . . . is at an end.’”).
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its ultimate determination to increase funding of low-income energy assistance
during the clean energy transition.308
These legal standards could be interpreted to support further efforts to
broaden who receives the benefits of clean energy. For example, the idea of “no
undue discrimination” arguably supports arrangements like community solar
and other efforts to make participation in the new clean energy economy more
widespread—otherwise, programs that prove over time to be accessible only to
certain classes of customer might well be considered “discriminatory.” Or, legis-
lators and regulators might be moved by an argument that “just and reasonable”
rates must, during times of transitions to pricing systems based on time of con-
sumption, include a guarantee against extreme volatility in low-income con-
sumers’ rates.309 More broadly, as the clean energy transition gathers speed,
regulators and legislators may become open to arguments that the fundamental
concept of “just and reasonable” rates requires spreading the costs of a society-
wide clean energy transition society wide, such that volumetric electricity rates
no longer make sense as the primary way to fund clean energy policy.
B. Thinking Structurally About Expanding Clean Energy’s Benefits
In our section on the distribution of clean energy’s benefits, we focused on
several common equity complaints lodged against clean energy incentive pro-
grams such as net metering and electric vehicle rebates. And we discussed how
states are attempting to widen access through programs like community solar
and tiered rebates. But there remains a fundamental challenge to these band-
aids: They are still designed around consumer choices, such that the most they
can do is provide clean energy benefits to some low-income subscribers who
choose to take advantage of them. They continue to leave many out of their
gains.
For this reason, and with a fuller view of clean energy’s justice implications
in hand, it may be worthwhile for clean energy justice advocates and policy-
makers to angle their lens towards broader structural fixes that do not operate
consumer by consumer. For example, take the case of electric vehicle rebates:
The ultimate goal of these programs is to improve air quality and reduce green-
house gas emissions. To spread these benefits widely, policymakers are now
beginning to focus on expanding low-income consumers’ electric vehicle own-
ership.310 But research suggests that these consumer-by-consumer approaches
may not reap the biggest gains for low-income communities. Instead, electrify-
308. See Welton, Grid Modernization, supra note 45, at 601. R
309. See Severin Borenstein, Effective and Equitable Adoption of Opt-In Residential Dynamic Elec-
tricity Pricing, 42 REV. IND. ORGAN. 127, 131 (2013) (describing “minimizing volatility” as
a core principal of residential rate design).
310. See supra Part IV.
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ing diesel buses that pass through local communities would bring much greater
air quality gains.311
Similarly, electrifying vehicles is only one component of the larger chal-
lenge of tackling emissions from transportation. Expanding access to public
transportation is another component, and one that is much more likely to
broadly benefit low-income residents, given that “more than 70 percent of pub-
lic transit commuters earn less than $25,000 per year.”312 In the same vein, cities
might be able to contract for renewable energy on behalf of all their residents
more thoughtfully and at prices lower than community solar rates, thereby cre-
ating a net gain that extends beyond the reach of any solar subscription
program.313
Accordingly, as researchers, lawmakers, and advocates strategize how to
achieve the goals of clean energy justice, we should conscientiously grapple with
the distributive tradeoffs among various climate strategies, rather than just the
quintile distributions of particular clean energy incentives.
C. Looking Beyond Traditional Regulatory Participation
A resounding theme of our evaluation of procedural justice in the energy
field is that traditional citizen participation is challenging across energy’s gov-
erning institutions. For this reason, it may not be realistic—or fruitful—to ex-
pect community groups to participate much more than they currently do in
state clean energy proceedings.314 Frustration at the barriers to participation in
such proceedings has driven growing demands for “energy democracy,” which
might decentralize decisionmaking away from PUCs and RTOs.315 In particu-
lar, many groups have turned their attention to “community choice aggrega-
tion” (“CCA”) arrangements, which allow communities—after successful
referenda or city council votes—to take control of their energy purchasing deci-
sions (while leaving their local utility in charge of distribution and billing).316
311. See DAN WELCH, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLUTIONS, ELECTRIFIED TRANSPOR-
TATION FOR ALL: HOW ELECTRIFICATION CAN BENEFIT LOW-INCOME COMMUNITIES
1 (2017).
312. Id. at 3.
313. See, e.g., Lorenzo Kristov, Comments in Response to the October 31, 2017, Informal Public
Workshop on California Consumer Choice, at 4–5 (Nov. 28, 2017) (unpublished comment)
(on file with authors) (arguing that models that allow cities to enter these contracts—known
as “Community Choice Aggregation”—provide benefits beyond those that can be achieved
by “consumer choice”).
314. See supra Part V.
315. See Welton, Grasping for Energy Democracy, supra note 1, at 585 (noting that energy democ- R
racy is a freighted term without clear boundaries, but observing that more local ownership
and control forms one key strategy within the movement).
316. California provides the most striking example of the potential profusion of CCAs: A 2018
article reports that “85 percent of California’s retail load could be served by CCAs or direct
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Similarly, arrangements where local communities actually own or control renew-
able energy resources (as compared to merely purchasing subscriptions in utility
projects) might provide new means of meaningful participation in energy deci-
sionmaking, while contributing to economic development and local job
growth.317
Local renewables thus provide an example of how addressing issues in
concert might be fruitful. A fuller understanding of clean energy’s procedural
justice challenges—coupled with an appreciation of its substantial economic
benefits—counsels for more attention here. Clean energy justice advocates
might prioritize partnerships with groups focused on developing new modes
and models of local energy control and ownership, where justice concerns can
be more easily raised and attended to.318 Such localization of energy decision-
making might also ease siting burdens, as communities are substantially more
likely to accept the siting of projects over which they feel they have sufficient
control.319
access providers by 2025.” Jeff St. John, California Sets New Rules for Community Choice
Aggregators, GREENTECHMEDIA (Feb. 14, 2018), https://perma.cc/MYP9-Z2BA. CCAs
are currently allowed in seven states: California, New York, Massachusetts, Illinois, New
Jersey, Ohio, and Rhode Island. Id. It is worth noting, however, that CCA arrangements
present some justice challenges of their own (akin to net metering) if exiting communities do
not pay their fair share of legacy grid costs. The California Public Utility Commission has
just concluded a contentious set of proceedings on this topic, and its administrative law
judges endorsed a revised “Power Charge Indifference Adjustment” to appropriately dis-
tribute utility costs to exiting communities. See Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Order Instituting
Rulemaking to Review, Revise, and Consider Alternatives to the Power Charge Indifference
Adjustment, Rulemaking 17-06-026, at 5, 70, 85 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Aug. 18, 2018),
https://perma.cc/79MN-HACG.
317. Jarr Hicks & Nicola Ison, An Exploration of the Boundaries of ‘Community’ in Community
Renewable Energy Projects: Navigating between Motivations and Context, 113 ENERGY POL’Y
523, 523–24 (2018) (noting that community energy is a “ ‘vague’ . . . and sometimes ‘prob-
lematic’ ” term because it at times includes projects developed by external corporate entities,
with limited community benefit).
318. See Shalanda H. Baker, Unlocking the Energy Commons: Expanding Community Energy Gen-
eration 16–17 (Ne. Pub. Law & Theory Faculty Research Papers Series No. 318-2018),
https://perma.cc/G5JL-FYHP (advocating a “new energy commons” as a framing concept
for such models); Shelley Welton, Public Energy, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267, 308 (2017)
(describing the growth of “Community Choice Aggregation” as a means of local energy
control); Uma Outka, Cities and the Low-Carbon Grid, 46 ENVTL. L. 105, 145–55 (2016)
(exploring emerging local strategies to decarbonize the grid).
319. See Emmanuel Songsore & Michael Buzzelli, Ontario’s Experience of Wind Energy Develop-
ment as Seen Through the Lens of Human Health and Environmental Justice, 13 INT’L J.
ENVTL. RES. & PUB. HEALTH 684, 695 (2016) (highlighting procedural justice challenges
of wind siting in Ontario); Maarten Wolsink, Wind Power Implementation: The Nature of
Public Attitudes: Equity and Fairness Instead of “Backyard Motives,” 11 RENEWABLE & SUS-
TAINABLE ENERGY REV. 1188, 1204 (2005) (reporting that local, collaborative decision-
making is the best way to ease siting challenges in Europe).
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D. Clean Energy Siting Burdens: Mandating More Systematic Evaluation
As we noted in our siting section, attention to distributive justice chal-
lenges in the siting of clean energy projects is limited. Claims against clean
energy raised at the time of siting often succumb to the argument that “the few
should stand aside for the many”320—even if the same few are continuously and
disproportionately standing aside. Perhaps, though, earlier intervention—at the
stage where legislators or regulators are developing or revising clean energy
goals—might better forestall inequitable siting burdens. If addressed at this
stage, a program could build in parameters to avoid overburdening particular
communities.321 It might do so by denying expedited permitting to facilities
located in overly burdened areas, or by rewarding extra credits or incentives for
building in less developed parts of a state. Alternatively, in traditionally regu-
lated states where utilities remain in charge of generation, utilities might be
required to integrate considerations of renewable siting demographics into their
mandatory long-term planning.322 This would force companies to comprehen-
sively map renewables’ concentrations in ways that could further our under-
standing of whether renewable energy disproportionately burdens certain
lower-income communities or communities of color.
Of course, to effectively advocate for attention to renewable energy’s geo-
graphic distribution at earlier policy stages will require effective intervention at
the PUC. Our analysis of energy’s procedural justice challenges does not sug-
gest that this task will be easy. However, one systematic intervention in a PUC
rulemaking about clean energy is certainly easier than multiple siting proceed-
ings, each occurring once development is essentially preordained.
VIII. CONCLUSION: A CALL TO THE ACADEMIC COMMUNITY
This Article’s formulation of a more comprehensive clean energy justice
agenda highlights opportunities to tackle its challenges with renewed attention
to their interrelatedness and importance. At the same time, we have been struck
over the course of our research at the sparse data on clean energy’s justice impli-
cations. This paucity of data may have been acceptable when clean energy still
320. Outka, Renewable Energy Footprint, supra note 273, at 305–06 (quoting Susan Lorde Mar- R
tin, Wind Farms and NIMBYs: Generating Conflict, Reducing Litigation, 20 FORDHAM
ENVTL. L. REV. 427, 430 (2010)).
321. Such an effort might draw from Uma Outka’s similar call for more comprehensive planning
of renewable energy siting to manage land use impacts. Outka, Renewable Energy Footprint,
supra note 273, at 246. R
322. See Boyd, supra note 44, at 1660, 1693 (discussing state processes for comprehensive plan- R
ning). Alice Kaswan has also documented California’s creation of an advisory committee to
review the impacts of climate policies on disadvantaged communities—which is perhaps
another useful model that states could draw from. See Kaswan, supra note 180, at 575. R
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played a bit part in the grid, but it cannot persist now that we understand clean
energy’s current and future growth projections.
Our project has highlighted several areas where additional research could
help to develop a richer understanding of the scale and scope of clean energy’s
justice implications and inform policymaking priorities. Most well researched
are the questions regarding who pays for clean energy, because utilities mount-
ing cross-subsidization claims have incentives to undertake supportive empirical
research. Solar companies, in response, have generated their own empirical
studies.323
In contrast, where there is no clear corporate motive for information pro-
duction, research has languished—and it will be up to the academy or govern-
ment to fill in the gaps. One obvious place to begin is the demographic
distribution of clean energy jobs, which will help illuminate the extent to which
clean energy is failing or succeeding in providing blue collar, stable jobs for a
diverse workforce—and might call attention to the need for policy reforms.
Similarly, more research into whether those rural communities likely to be most
burdened with renewable energy are also low-income and/or communities of
color will help define the contours of clean energy’s justice-related siting chal-
lenges. And as community solar and other efforts at broadening clean energy
participation grow, continuing to collect and expand data on who takes advan-
tage of these offerings will help regulators to understand whether these efforts
succeed. It would also be useful to pair data on energy poverty with data on
state net metering, grid modernization, and similar initiatives, to help under-
stand whether substantial investment in these types of programs risks exacer-
bating the challenges of affording adequate energy.
An ideal research portfolio would not only pursue each of these questions,
but also attempt to amalgamate their results, to create a deeper understanding
of the ways in which clean energy policies, as implemented, contribute to or
help to alleviate continued income and racial disparities in the United States.
We hope this Article serves as a first step in this direction, by sharpening our
understandings of clean energy’s myriad justice challenges and opportunities
and opening up a conversation about how and why these form an emerging
agenda worthy of attention.
323. See LAURA HANSEN ET AL., A REVIEW OF SOLAR PV BENEFIT & COST STUDIES 22 (2d
ed. 2013) (meta-study collecting seventeen recent studies of solar power’s value to the grid,
performed by a range of utilities, institutes, and solar providers).
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APPENDIX: RESULTS OF STATE PUC PROCEEDINGS ANALYSIS
Methodology
To better understand levels of community group participation in PUC
proceedings regarding clean energy, we undertook a limited empirical analysis
of some of the most relevant recent state proceedings.
We analyzed twelve state PUC proceedings from around the United States
(see Table 1). Each proceeding was either underway or recently concluded as of
fall 2017, so as to provide a snapshot of current-day participation rates. In se-
lecting our proceedings, we looked for generic public utility “rulemaking” dock-
ets that substantially touched upon clean energy concerns in the state; we did
not include any adjudicatory proceedings even when they might have significant
clean energy policy import. We imposed this limitation in order to understand
best-case scenarios for community participation in PUC proceedings. We be-
lieve that limiting our survey to rulemakings best captures this aim, because
groups with limited resources are more likely to participate in overarching
rulemaking proceedings rather than case-by-case adjudications. We also chose
proceedings with more than ten filing parties, a number we took to be indica-
tive of the potential for the rulemaking to have impacts to entities beyond
utilities.
We do not purport to have identified a comprehensive list of proceedings
that may meet these criteria, as our goal in this project was not a definitive
empirical study of participation rates in PUC proceedings. Instead, our aim was
to understand whether our sense (gleaned from research and practice experi-
ence) that participation in PUC proceedings remains difficult could be con-
firmed through analysis of several important examples.
For each proceeding, a research assistant reviewed a list of filing parties
and coded those filing parties considered a “community group” (see Table 2).
We included within the category of “community group” any state-level or local-
level group of citizens collectively asserting a position in a proceeding. We did
not include individual filings (which tended to come from affected businesses),
nor did we include national-level groups that participate across states (however,
many of these national groups partnered with community groups in their fil-
ings, in which case we included the community groups that joined as part of a
filing with a larger national group).
Finally, a research assistant analyzed the contents of all community group
filings to determine whether the group raised (1) concerns related to “distribu-
tive justice”—that is, the substantive distribution of benefits and burdens
among various groups; and (2) concerns related to “procedural justice”—that is,
the fairness of the process used by the PUC during the rulemaking (see Tables
2 and 3).
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We are exceedingly grateful to Advanced Energy Economy for research access to their
Powersuite database, which made this analysis possible.
TABLE 1. LIST OF PROCEEDINGS ANALYZED, BY STATE
State Docket # Name of Docket 
Cal 1 R1408013 
Order Instituting Rulemaking Regarding Policies, 
Procedures And Rules For Development Of 
Distribution Resources Plans Pursuant To Public 
Utilities Code Section 769. 
Cal 2 R1410003 
Order Instituting Rulemaking To Create A 
Consistent Regulatory Framework For The 
Guidance, Planning And Evaluation Of Integrated 
Distributed Energy Resources. 
Texas TX:40000 Commission Proceeding To Ensure Resource Adequacy In Texas 
Maryland PC44 
In The Matter Of Transforming Maryland’s Electric 
Distribution Systems To Ensure That Electric 
Service Is Customer-Centered, Affordable, Reliable 
And Environmentally Sustainable In Maryland. 
Washington DC FC1 130 
In The Matter Of The Instituting Into Modernizing 
The Energy Delivery Structure For Increased 
Sustainability 
Arizona E-00000Q-16-0289 
To Open A Docket For Review, Modernization And 
Expansion Of The Arizona Energy Standards And 
Tariff Rules And Associated Rules. 
Pennsylvania PA : L-2014-2404361
Notice Of Proposed Rulemaking To Revise The 
Alternative Energy Portfolio Standards (Aeps) Act 
Regulations 
Nevada NV: 16-07001 
Application Of Sierra Pacific Power Company 
DIR/A Nv Energy For Approval Of Its 2017-2036 
Triennial Integrated Resource Plan And 2017-2019 
Energy Supply Plan. 
New York 14-00549/14-M-0094 Proceeding On Motion Of The Commission To Consider A Clean Energy Fund. 
Minnesota MN: 15-556 In The Matter Of A Commission Inquiry Into Grid Modernization 
Massachusetts MA: 12-76 
Investigation By The Department Of Public Utilities 
On Its Own Motion Into Modernization Of The 
Electric Grid. 
Missouri EW-20 17-0245 In the Matter of A Working Case to Explore Emerging Issues in Utility Regulation 
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TABLE 2. COMMUNITY GROUPS’ PARTICIPATION RATES AND CONCERNS
SNAPSHOT ANALYSIS TAKEN IN NOVEMBER 2017
 Cal 1 Cal 2 MD MO NV TX DC AZ PA NV MN MA Totals 
Total Filing Parties 64 69 51 15 110 21 114 29 91 44 23 184 815 
Community Groups 3 4 2 1 12 0 7 1 8 1 1 5 45 
Raised distributive 
justice concerns 3 2 2 1 10 0 5 0 4 1 1 5 34 
Raised procedural 
justice concerns 3 2 2 1 10 0 3 0 2 1 1 1 26 
TABLE 3. PERCENTAGE OF COMMUNITY GROUP PARTICIPATION AND
PERCENTAGE RAISING JUSTICE CONCERNS
 Cal 1 Cal 2 MD MO NY TX DC AZ PA NV MN MA Totals 
Percentage of 
Participants 
Identified as 
“Community 
Group” 
4.7 5.8 3.9 6.7 10.9 0.0 6.1 3.4 8.8 2.3 43 2.7 5.5 
Percentage of 
Community 
Groups Raising 
Distributive 
Justice Concerns 
100.0 50.0 100.0 100.0 83.3 0.0 71.4 0.0 50.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 75.6 
Percentage of 
Community 
Groups Raising 
Procedural 
Justice Concerns 
100.0 50.0 100.0 100.0 83.3 0.0 42.9 0.0 25.0 100.0 100.0 20.0 57.8 
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